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Abstract

Drawing on work by Carol Dweck, Moral Self-Theory was conceptualized as describing lay
views of the moral self-concept as either malleable (incrementalist view) or fixed (entity view) in
order to better capture the goal-achievement aspect of morality. To this end, research into the
areas of implicit theories of intelligence and personality were drawn upon to explore the
possibility that lay views of morality could help inform our understanding of moral behaviour.
Three studies were designed to: 1) examine individuals’ perceptions of their moral self-concept
over time for evidence of change and assess participants’ opinions towards that change, as well
as any change that may occur in the future; 2) investigate broad correlational relationships
between lay perceptions of the malleability of the moral-self and other predictors of moral
behaviour, specifically moral identity and moral motivation; 3) examine whether incrementalist
beliefs about the moral self-concept could effectively be manipulated, and predict behaviour in
an experimental setting. Three studies were conceptualized and carried out, reported here as
Chapters 2, 3, and 4. The first study utilized previously collected interview data to determine that
participants perceived changes in their moral identity retrospectively, but that there was a group
of participants that did not perceive any change. Additionally, participants were asked their
views about changes in their moral identity that may occur in the future. This study provided a
clear mandate to pursue the exploration of individual’s views on change in moral self-concept.
The second study established a measure for assessing the malleability beliefs of the moral-self,
and then proceeded to explore the relationships between these beliefs and other commonly used
moral variables in three different age groups. Significant correlations were found between Moral
Self-Theory and internalized moral identity, prosocial behaviour, and antisocial behaviour. The
third and final study experimentally tested whether Moral Self-Theory could be experimentally
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manipulated, and if that manipulation would show an effect on observed moral behaviour. While
Moral Self-Theory was successfully manipulated towards either an entity or incremental
viewpoint, this manipulation did not show any effects on the prosocial or antisocial behavioural
measures. The possibility of Moral Self-Theory being more relevant to long-term behavioural
dispositions rather than a direct motivator of immediate moral behaviour is discussed, as well as
limitations to the current studies and their implications for future research.
Keywords: morality, implicit theories, moral behaviour, moral development
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Chapter 1

Exploring individuals’ views on the malleability of their moral self-concept
It can be seen as a common trope that the world is in a constant state of change. Indeed,
according to a quote often attributed to the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, the only constant in life
is change itself. And while there are certainly those who seem to oppose change as the norm, it
cannot be denied that modern society itself is a product of change. In many cases constraining
our understanding of concepts to binary opposing options, such as change versus stability, seems
overly simplistic. However, in the case of change and our self-concept, this simple dichotomy
may in fact be very useful. A large body of literature has arisen from Carol Dweck’s work
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al., 1995) on Implicit Self-Theories (for reviews and metaanalyses see Burnette et al, 2020; Burnette et al., 2013; Dweck & Yeager, 2019; Sisk et al.,
2018). Generalizing her work on learned helplessness and mastery learning, she developed a
theory in which goals are the central determinants of task selection and responses to difficulties
encountered within the task (Elliott & Dweck, 1988). Whether the goal is process focused
(wanting to learn more), versus outcome focused (wanting to get a good mark), was seen as the
result of an underlying psychological self-theory, that is, whether the individual held an
incremental or entity view of their intelligence (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
The notion that how individual’s view themselves as either fixed (entity view) or
malleable (incremental view) evolved from work in education and learning, and thus this theory
has taken root most notably in the realm of intelligence and academic achievement. The purpose
of the current program of study is to examine morality and the moral self-concept through the
lens of Implicit Self-Theory, perhaps revealing additional evidence into their relationship with
moral behaviour, by exploring the possibility that individuals have a Moral Self-Theory. That is,
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will individuals endorse either an incremental self-theory, or an entity self-theory, when it comes
to their moral self-concept? In psychology, morality is often defined by values such as honesty,
compassion, fairness, and caring (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Lasky, 2001), that are
generally focused around the promotion and protection of the welfare of others (Hart et al.,
1998). Further to this, the moral self-concept is how important these values are to an individual’s
sense of self. Another term that is often used for the centrality of morality to the self-concept is
moral identity (Jennings et al., 2015). In this program of study we will be focusing on the
specific definition of moral identity as popularized by Aquino and Reed (2002), who base their
definition on nine specific moral character traits, i.e., caring, fair, helpful, compassionate,
friendly, generous, hardworking, kind, and honest. While these are not necessarily the only
definitions of these terms, they are what will be used for the current program. Hierarchically, the
moral self-concept can be seen as one aspect of the moral self, along with other aspects such as
moral emotions or moral reasoning (Jennings et al., 2015). How this self-importance of morality
produces or impacts an individual’s moral behaviours, however, is a matter that is far from
decided. The current program of studies strives to elucidate how lay views of the moral selfconcept as malleable may promote moral behaviour, and also to further explore the role of goalorientation in the promotion of moral behaviour.
In order to better grasp how this program fills a gap in our current understanding of the
relationship between the moral self and moral behaviour, three topics must be addressed: First
will be a review of literature on self-change and Implicit Self-Theory, specifically as it relates to
morality. This will not only serve to familiarize Dweck’s work, but lay the groundwork for how
it will be applied to the domain of morality. Second, a brief review will cover some of the
research on moral identity. Moral identity was conceived of (Blasi, 1983), and is commonly seen
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as a construct to bridge the gap between moral reasoning and moral action (Hardy & Carlo,
2011; Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Thus, if the current program is to explore how Moral SelfTheory might relate to these concepts, a review of moral identity would be well warranted. Third
and final, will be a discussion of the pertinent areas of moral motivation research, along with
accounts provided by self-determination theory. Self-Determination Theory characterizes
motivation in terms of their locus of origin, juxtaposing internal and external sources. After these
bodies of literature have been examined, the three studies that comprise the present dissertation
research program will be presented in detail.
Implicit Self-Theory
Dweck and Leggett (1988) outlined a theory that deals with opposing mindsets in terms
of the ability of an individual’s core traits to change. The authors termed these two archetypes
entity and incremental theorists. Entity theorists see themselves and the world around them as
unchanging, and even unchangeable. They are often seen as being predisposed to expressing a
helplessness orientation in the face of adversity or failure. Opposing these entity theorists are the
incremental theorists. They see themselves and the world as changing and changeable. They are
more likely to show a mastery orientation in response to failure, and have been shown to have
increased internal motivation over time (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Later, this idea was
operationalized into scales that measure to what degree one’s core concepts of self, or even
personality itself, may be perceived as malleable (Dweck et al., 1995). Perhaps the best known of
these areas is intelligence, which is exemplified in Dweck’s work focusing on education (Claro
et al., 2016; Hecht, et al., 2021; Lin-Siegler et al., 2016; Rattan et al., 2015; Yeager et al., 2019).
Promoting the view of intelligence as malleable rather than stable has been utilized extensively
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in educational settings to promote a positive view of learning, and promote internal motivation
for learning (see Blackwell et al., 2007 or Haimovitz et al., 2011 as examples).
Existing research has shown the positive effects of having an incremental self-theory in
such areas as environmental engagement (Soliman & Wilson, 2017), psychological well-being
(e.g. Bernecker et al., 2017; Schroder et al., 2017), sexuality and relationship well-being (e.g.
Maxwell et al., 2017), emotion regulation (e.g. Gutentag et al., 2017), job performance (Zingoni
& Corey, 2017), and athletic ability (Mascret et al., 2016). Likewise, educational psychology has
shown the benefits of an incrementalist view in overall academic success (e.g. Blackwell et al.,
2007; Good et al., 2003), maintenance of internal motivation (Haimovitz et al., 2011), academic
effort (Zingoni & Byron, 2017), value placed on school (e.g. Schutte et al., 2017), and writing
skill (e.g. Limpo & Alves, 2014). One area that was repeatedly mentioned early in the
development of measures for implicit theories, but has rarely been broached since, is the effect of
incremental self-theory in regards to morality (Benenson & Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett,
1988; Dweck et al., 1995; Hong et al., 1999). Additionally, while a variety of age groups are
represented in this area of research, from young children aged 5-8 years to adults, most of these
studies have focused on a single age group (22/25 studies). The notable exceptions are studies by
Haimovitz and colleagues (2011) that had participants from across elementary school, Schutte
and colleagues (2017) who recruited participants from grades 5 and 7, and Benenson and Dweck
(1986) who studied children in Kindergarten through grade 4. Unfortunately this means that none
of the studies have sampled adolescents, especially later adolescents. This is an important
demographic for the current program of study as it is an age where socio-cognitive development
is prominent and moral development research tends to focus.
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Dweck’s own research raised the possibility that morality could be another core aspect of
the self that these orientations towards change may effect (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Dweck et al.,
1995). Indeed, though an early paper focuses on the study of implicit theories and morality (Chiu
et al., 1997), the application of implicit self-theory in studies of morality and moral behaviour
has been rare. This would certainly seem like an untapped vein of insight into the role of goalorientations in moral self-concept, moral motivation, and moral behaviour. Considering also how
Dweck has positioned Implicit Self-Theory as structuring how individual’s react to actions and
their outcomes, it would seem to be a natural extension to apply this model to moral actions.
Dweck goes further to specify that those who endorse an entity theory appear to react with more
retribution, as opposed to rehabilitation or education (Dweck et al., 1995). This gap in the
Implicit Self-Theory literature provides an opportunity to explore the possibility that whether an
individual holds an incremental or entity view of their morality, may have an observable effect
on their moral behaviour. Considering the modest performance of even the most popular
predictors of moral behaviour (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Malti & Krettenauer, 2009; Villegas
de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 2015), any further elucidation of the process that produces moral
behaviour would be welcome. Furthermore, if there is a relationship between holding an
incremental view of the moral self and behaviour, can it be externally manipulated, and could
this relationship be used to promote moral behaviour?
While increasing the salience of morality through priming is commonplace in morality
research, the manipulation of such an important aspect of the self merits further review.
Strohminger and Nichols (2014) demonstrated that moral traits are seen as an essential
component of the self, even suggesting that morality in general may be the most important
component. Any change in an individual’s morality is seen by the individual as a major change
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in their identity. In other words, individuals may change a host of other physical and mental traits
and remain, at their core, the same person; but a change to their moral traits incites a view that
they have fundamentally changed their sense of who they are. This essential nature of morality to
the self-concept relates to whether an individual might see their moral self-concept as malleable
or not in that it provides grounds for possibly preferring stability. It also provides an opposing
view of malleability always being the preferable state, as seen in intelligence (Diener & Dweck,
1978; 1980). An individual becoming more moral may be welcomed, but becoming less moral
likely would not. From another viewpoint, if an individual sees themselves as sufficiently moral,
they may not see any reason for change, or possibly even seek to avoid it. Considering Chiu and
colleagues’ (1997) findings that post-secondary students could have their views on a person’s
character manipulated, it would seem that some may see their morality as changeable, but this
does not necessarily indicate a preference in the case of incremental views versus entity views.
A common scale measure of moral identity, the Self Importance of Moral Identity,
identifies the traits that can be consistently associated with a moral character and asks
participants to rate how important to them it is to have these traits (Aquino & Reed, 2002). It is
commonly interpreted as measuring the degree to which holding a moral identity is important to
their general sense of self. The internal consistency of these and other moral traits is a core
assumption in this measure of moral identity and, since it has been cited over 1300 times, it is a
core element of a great deal of moral identity research. Therefore, if the perception of the moral
self-concept as either a trait (entity view) or a state (incremental view) is to be explored, it seems
that an examination of moral identity would be warranted. Furthermore, since Erikson (1956) it
has been assumed that identity, including moral identity, develops during adolescence. Recent
research has revealed some of the changes that occur during this period involve differentiation of
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identity according to social context (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017), and so an examination of the
moral development that occurs in and around this age would be helpful in developing a
conception of what the malleability of morality may involve.
Moral Identity
It is nearly impossible to discuss moral development without referring, at some point, to
the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (see Kohlberg, 1968; 1972; for overviews of theory). While
moral development research has evolved considerably since Kohlberg, his Stages of Moral
Development remain a foundational view of moral reasoning and behaviour. While moral
reasoning has declined in importance as a predictor of moral behaviour, Kohlberg’s idea that it is
moral judgment that produces moral action (Kohlberg & Candee, 1984) has certainly avoided
obsolescence. Recent meta-analyses have partially validated the role of moral reasoning, finding
that it produces a small-to-moderate effect on action (Villegas de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo,
2015). However, in a review of the applicable literature, Blasi (1983) put forward that in order to
motivate action; morality must have some sense of self-importance attached to it. Blasi went on
to describe the motivational function of a construct that would fill this cognition-action gap in
terms of the importance morality plays within the individual’s self-concept. This construct was
labeled as an individual’s moral identity. Thus, began the investigation of the role of moral
identity in the prediction of moral behaviour, leading to our current conceptualization of moral
identity, and the self-importance thereof (see Aquino & Reed, 2002, for an overview).
In a foundational paper, Blasi (1983) included a particular emphasis on internal
consistency in the definition of a moral identity, in that it is this consistency which is the
motivating factor that binds an individual’s cognitive reasoning, and moral actions, across
disparate situations. This motivation provided by a desire for internal consistency is what bridges
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the cognition-action gap. In this same vein, Colby and Damon (1992) posit that it is the
incorporation of morality into the self that provides the motivation to act morally. While all of
these theories see moral behaviour as driven by a primarily deliberative process, this idea has
been challenged in recent years from the moral intuitionist approach (see Haidt, 2008), where the
moral motivation stems from unconscious motivation and emotional responses, and moral
cognition only provides a post-hoc rationale for behaviour (Schnall et al., 2008).
As Hardy and Carlo (2011) point out, more thorough models of moral identity are needed
if we are to better understand its role in predicting or producing moral behaviour. One of the
foremost issues is the debate over the level of control an individual has over the process leading
to moral action. While some researchers, such as Blasi (1983), see moral identity as deliberative
and trait-like (see also Colby & Damon, 1992), others suggest that it is more situational and
automatic (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Narvaez et al., 2006). Among those in the situational and
automatic camp there is support for the moral intuitionist view. While evidence does support a
connection between disgust and moral judgements (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Laurent et al.,
2014), there is little to directly predict behaviour beyond the connection to judgments. Rather
than add to the debate over automatic versus deliberative, it may be worthwhile to ask what
might be moderating effects of moral identity. Two separate meta-analyses found that identity
was a moderately strong predictor of behavioural intentions (Paquin & Keating, 2017; Rise et al.,
2010). This is similar to findings from a meta-analysis examining the relationship between moral
identity and moral behaviour, which found a small to moderate average effect size (Hertz &
Krettenauer, 2016). While it is certainly an important concept in the study of morality, it would
seem that moral identity is not the bridge that Blasi hoped it would be. However, the body of
research that has been produced in the last few decades provides benefits well beyond that aim.
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Research into moral identity has turned out to span a vast array of areas (see Hardy &
Carlo, 2011, or Jennings et al., 2015, for reviews), such as examining its relationship with moral
emotions (Lefebvre & Krettenauer, 2019), how it is linked to moral disengagement and selfregulation (Hardy et al., 2015), and how, in connecting it with Self-Determination Theory, it can
be viewed as a goal for which we are motivated to act morally (Krettenauer, 2020). We act
morally in order to maintain our view that we are a moral person. This last area is one that is of
particular interest to the current discussion as it may provide important links to the research into
Implicit Self-Theory.
Considering this last area of research, it is not surprising that a meta-analysis has shown
moral identity can be predictive of moral behaviour just as well as moral reasoning (Hertz &
Krettenauer, 2016). Delving further into the research on moral identity, there is a body of
literature where moral identity is focused around core traits or values that individuals endorse.
These traits are either seen as reliably invoking morality (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or core values
used to describe a moral individual (Arnold, 1993). While these values are generally seen as
consistent and stable (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, Schwartz, 1992), there is evidence that their
relative importance can change from context to context (Krettenauer et al., 2016). Moral identity
has infrequently been examined in the context of its development (Krettenauer, 2020), and thus
little is known about the changes in moral identity individuals may experience, how the
individuals may view and experience these changes, or the effects these changes may have. If we
look to Dweck’s implicit theory of intelligence as an example, when individuals see their
intelligence as malleable they see their goal as increasing their competence in that aspect. By
contrast, when they see their intelligence as an entity, as a trait, they see their goal as
demonstrating proficiency to gain positive judgments and avoid negative judgments (Dweck &
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Leggett, 1988). Could individuals who see their morality as changing view being more moral as
a goal? While the development of morality and a moral identity could be seen as parallel to
holding an incremental view, it would seem that the view of moral identity as trait-based would
suggest an entity view. Do people see their morality as changing? If so, is this view limited to
periods of development? This present program of three studies will attempt to address the role of
change in an individual’s morality and moral identity: To determine whether holding an
incremental or entity view of their morality impacts their behaviour. To better conceptualize
motivation and its effects on morality, Self-Determination Theory will be used as a foundation.
Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory was created to account for behaviour as an
interaction of person and environment (1980). The roles of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for
behaviour are central to the theory, and can be an effective lens for viewing moral motivation
and behaviour. Intrinsic motivation refers to a strictly internal desire, fueled by interest or
enjoyment, rather than external rewards or recognition, and is seen as entirely self-determined.
As it is internal and self-determined, intrinsic motivation can be seen as more stable, and less
affected by environmental stimuli, as it is less variable in its autonomy, and thus less in need of
external regulation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Intrinsic motivation has been
shown to strengthen the effect of motivation on prosocial behaviour (Grant, 2008), which
suggests that a strong, internal motivation may produce higher amounts of moral behaviour over
a longer time period. This relationship between the integration of morality into the self-concept
and intrinsic motivation was not shown to fully explain their relationship; rather this imperfect
association should promote the idea that intrinsic motivation is a separate and important aspect of
promoting moral behaviour. Returning to the Implicit Self-Theory of Intelligence literature, it
has been shown that maintaining intrinsic motivation in learning is associated with incremental
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self-theories of intelligence (Haimovitz et al., 2011). Could holding an incremental view of
morality, or moral identity, be related to moral motivation in the same way? Could holding an
incremental view of morality have an effect on moral behaviour similar to how holding an
incremental view of intelligence effects academic achievement (Blackwell et al., 2007)?
Program of Study
This program of study takes the position that Implicit Self-Theory as applied to morality,
termed here Moral Self-Theory, can be very informative as to the motivation for moral behaviour
provided by an individual’s moral identity. The application of Moral Self-Theory to moral
behaviour is not a large step away from research already performed: If moral identity is assumed
to be a long-term motivational state, and that moral behaviour is a goal, then holding an
incremental view may be beneficial in producing effective goal attainment strategies and
avoiding negative emotional responses to setbacks (Burnette et al. 2013). Burnette and
colleagues examined the role of implicit theories of intelligence on self-regulatory processes,
with several of the processes focused on goals and their attainment. An analysis of 113 different
samples provided 273 effect sizes. Differences were found between entity and incremental
theorists in several processes that are applicable to the parallel processes in moral behaviour.
Incremental theorists were shown to be more likely to have an orientation towards learning
goals, rather than performance goals, as well as being less likely to experience negative emotions
in responses to setbacks.
Looking at the larger picture, this suggests that, if moral action or a moral identity is the
goal, incremental theorists are more likely to pursue the goal for the sake of the internal
satisfaction it provides, while entity theorists are more interested in simply demonstrating their
abilities, and potentially experience negative emotions as a result of self-monitoring. This may
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translate to the moral domain in individuals either continuously striving to be moral (incremental
theorists, internal motivation), versus those who simply want to be seen as moral (entity
theorists, external motivation). While this provides us with some idea of the differences the
implicit theories may provide in terms of motivation, how will this appear in terms of behaviour?
Some direction can be implied from a study done by Yeager and colleagues (2013 b) in which
incremental (belief in self-change) self-theories were used in an intervention workshop for a
diverse young adolescent population. The intervention group showed less aggressive retaliation
behaviours, and more apologizing behaviour post-intervention as compared to a control group, as
well as compared to a group that were given a coping skills workshop.
The first study, presented in Chapter 2, will attempt to further explore the potential for
perceiving moral change by examining individuals’ descriptions of their current moral selfconcept, as well as the moral self-concept of themselves in the past. These two measurements
will be compared to obtain a numeric value for magnitude of change in their self-rated moral
identities that can augment the interview questions on the perceived changes. Supplemental
interview data from a previous study (Krettenauer et al., 2016) will be examined for broad
themes in any reasons and explanations behind the changes. Additionally, the reasons given as to
how or why any changes occurred will be explored to help categorize any reasons given for
changes. The final exploratory facet of this study will be an inquiry into individuals’ views on
personal change in the future and how those views relate to their past experiences of change. In
Chapter 3 the second study will broadly address the relationships between moral identity, an
individual’s views on change within the self-concept and their moral framework, and moral
behaviour. It will incorporate several different age groups, to potentially identify any
developmental trends within the relationships between the variables of interest. This study will
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be survey based in order to appropriately assess the relationships between the constructs, and
gather data from a large enough sample. Finally, in Chapter 4 the third study will experimentally
examine an individual’s view of moral self-change and its role in influencing their moral
behaviour. This study will attempt to manipulate individuals’ view of their moral self-concept, in
regards to malleability, and then determine whether this manipulation has an effect on their
moral behaviour. As an individual’s overall moral identity is still assumed to be an important
predictor of moral behaviour beyond its ability to change, moral identity measurement will be
included in the overall program design.
An interesting finding in a meta-analysis on the relationship between moral identity and
moral behaviour was that direct and immediate observational measures showed smaller effect
sizes as compared to broad survey-style measures that encompass a greater time span and more
general tendencies (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). One potential explanation for this may be that
an individual’s specific behaviours (moral or otherwise) are subject to far more immediate
personal and environmental factors in the heat of the moment, and thus core traits and values
become relatively less salient. If this explanation is true, then people who view their self-concept
as a stable trait may have their morality relegated to a non-factor in the decision-making process,
thus increasing their likelihood of acting immorally. Conversely, those that view their selfconcept as malleable may have the kind of intrinsic motivation that prompts them to
continuously strive to act in a moral way, and thus have their moral identity remain salient
enough to increase the likelihood of moral behaviour. This of course assumes that the individual
has a moral identity that places high importance on morality, rather than not valuing it and seeing
morality as not overly important to who they are.
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Generally, the goal of this program is to explore individual’s perceptions of their own
morality, and their capacity to envision change in it. Are peoples’ views on the malleability of
their morality important to the study of morality, and what kinds of relationships will that view
have on other aspects of their morality? Thus, the questions that are at the core of this program
can be summarized as: 1) Do people perceive their morality, or moral identity, as having
changed over time, and do they expect it to continue changing? 2) How do an individual’s views
on their capacity for moral change relate to their moral identity, moral motivation, and moral
behaviour? 3) Can an individual’s view on their capacity to change have an impact on their
moral behaviour? To investigate these questions, a three-study program was undertaken.
Study 1 began the program with an examination of individuals’ perceived trajectories of
change within the moral identity construct. This was done through a content analysis of
structured interviews. A primarily adult sample was asked about their current moral identities, as
well as their perceptions of their past moral identities. They were also asked specifically about
any perceived changes in their moral identity from this past time-point to the present, and about
any possible reasons for them. This allowed for not only the previously mentioned content
analysis, but also for more quantitative analyses of the differences. Study 2 was correlational and
sampled from three different age groups (childhood, adolescence, early adulthood). It examined
the relationship between the moral identity construct, internal and external moral motivation,
Moral Self-Theory, and both prosocial and antisocial behaviour. This study also included an
examination of possible age-related trends across adolescence. Study 3 was an experimental
study that sought to empirically test the role of Moral Self-Theory in directly predicting
behaviour, as well as potential interactions with moral identity. Each completed study within this
program is presented as a chapter, with a concluding chapter summarizing key findings.
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Chapter 2

Lay Views on Moral Identity Change
When the changes that occur to an individual over time are studied, it is often done
without taking into account the individual’s own perception of the process. While this inclusion
would seem to add a certain amount of subjectivity to the process, when the process of concern is
one as fundamental to the human self-concept as is morality, the lack of awareness for the
subjective self-view may in fact be leaving out a rich source of information about the process. By
excluding the first-hand experiences of the individual actually involved in the process, a valuable
source of information has been omitted from the scope of examination. The intention of the
current study is to examine the perception of changes in moral identity that take place over time,
from the perspective of the individual. Do people see their morality as changing across time
and/or development? If so, will they be able to provide the reasons behind the perceived
changes? This study will attempt to determine if there are common themes around the reasons
people may provide for these changes.
This study explores individuals’ retrospective accounts of moral identity change over
several years, and utilizes previously collected data from an older population. While this will
provide an interesting contrast to the age group most commonly used when dealing with identity
development, adolescents, it is not without precedence. In examining moral development across
a broad age range, Krettenauer and colleagues (2016) have shown that moral identity can
continue to change well past the adolescent years (see also Krettenauer & Victor, 2017 for
changes found in moral identity motivation). Specifically, the mean level of moral identity
showed a steady increase from adolescence through middle age. Their expectations were based
on Roberts and Wood’s (2006) maturity principle, where individuals are posited to develop
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towards maturity, specifically in terms of becoming more considerate of others, self-controlled,
responsible, and emotionally stable. This can be seen in personality traits such as
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability becoming stronger. Importantly, these
personality traits have been found to be definitional in terms of moral personality (Lapsley &
Hill, 2009). Krettenauer and colleagues (2016) showed that the mean level of moral identity was
higher in adults when using a cross sectional design with samples that ranged in age from 14-65
years, and that this increase was associated with similar changes in these moral personality traits.
With this linear trend in mind, the current questions as to how individuals themselves experience
this change in a core aspect of their identity increases in interest.
Temporal Self-Appraisal
When dealing with a concept such as moral identity, it is important to note that it can be
very important in terms of self-regard, and thus subject to a temporal self-appraisal bias (Wilson
& Ross, 2001). This bias serves to maintain a more positive self-appraisal by evaluating past
selves, especially distant past selves, as less positive in comparison to the current self. This bias
can lead toward a perception of self-improvement over time (Ross & Wilson, 2003), and even to
viewing the past self as a former version of the self, drawing a clear distinction from the current
self (Wilson et al., 2009). Furthermore, there is some evidence that individuals become more
critical of their past selves, with longer timespans leading to larger discrepancies. Again, this is
not implying that people denigrate their past selves, only that they see them as less positive than
their current self.
This effect of viewing the past self not as positively as the current self is not limited to
younger ages as it occurs in middle age samples, where it is especially salient for attributes
deemed important to their self-concept (Wilson & Ross, 2001). However, of the attributes
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specified by Wilson and Ross (2001), the only one that is consistently associated with morality is
dishonest, an undesirable trait. Another attribute that has been identified as a potentially moral
trait is broad minded (as identified in Krettenauer et al., 2016), but it is not in the most
commonly used measure from Aquino and Reed (2002) and is rarely used. In the study that
compared a middle age sample to a younger one, the middle age group only showed the temporal
self-appraisal effect for desirable traits. Unfortunately, the attributes are only reported in
aggregate, so it is unknown what specific effect this moral trait had on the analysis. It is less
clear how this bias acts once an individual is beyond middle age, as other research has suggested
that older individuals may perceive stability in terms of psychological constructs, such as wellbeing (Ryff, 1991). In their discussion of their findings, Wilson and Ross (2001) do admit that
viewing the past self as less positive may be partially attributable to actual development;
however, as the current study investigates participants’ perception of change, this subjective bias
may cause an individual to over-estimate the change they have undergone.
Moral Identity
A great deal of the current research on moral identity is based on the idea that moral
identity is focused around core traits or values that individuals endorse. These traits are either
seen as reliably invoking morality (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or core values used to describe a
moral individual (Arnold, 1993). The current study uses the values-based approach to allow for
not only individual variation in the definition of a moral identity, but in changes to the relative
importance of these values that may occur during development. This inherent flexibility in the
relative importance of the selected traits does invoke a certain measure of socio-cognitive
flexibility not normally seen in a trait-based approach, but which has provided some evidence for
moral identity development in previous research (Krettenauer et al., 2016).
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Moral identity research has traditionally focused on adolescence as the key period for
development, as in keeping with identity research in general. However, most of the research into
adolescent development of moral identity has not been able to discern significant change during
this portion of the lifespan, or the period immediately following, emerging adulthood. As
mentioned previously, Krettenauer and colleagues (2016) found evidence for moral identity
development after emerging adult, extending into middle age (46-65 years). Their study provided
evidence that as individuals grow older, greater importance is placed on the personal values
associated with morality. While these trends were associated with the personality development
suggested by the maturity principle, when those personality traits were controlled for, significant
effects of age were still present for moral identity. This trend of moral identity increase extended
beyond those of personality traits, which have been found to show the greatest mean-level
increases around the time of early adulthood (20-45 years, Roberts et al., 2005). It was suggested
that this finding supported the notion that moral identity and personality development are
complementary, rather than moral identity development being dependent on the development of
personality traits.
Moral Motivation
Moving beyond the perceived changes in values associated with moral identity, the
question arises as to the reasons behind these changes. In examining the motivation behind the
selection of personally relevant values, Krettenauer and Victor (2017) drew from SelfDetermination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2012). Self-Determination Theory was created to account
for behaviour as a joint action of person and environment (Deci & Ryan, 1980). The roles of
internal and external motivation in the determination of behaviour are central to the theory, and
can be an effective lens for viewing moral identity motivation. Internal motivation, fueled by

SELF-CHANGE AND MORALITY

19

interest or enjoyment rather than external rewards or recognition, is seen as self-determined.
Conversely, external motivation is seen as rooted in self-interest. As it is self-determined,
internal motivation can be seen as more stable, and less affected by environmental stimuli, as it is
less variable in its autonomy, and thus less in need of external regulation (Deci & Ryan, 1985;
Ryan & Deci, 2000).
Internal motivation has been shown to be an effective moderator for the effect of
motivation on prosocial behaviour (Grant, 2008), which may explain its relationship with moral
centrality as found by Krettenauer (2011). This strong relationship between the integration of
morality into the self-concept, or moral centrality, and internal motivation was shown to not
fully explain their relationship; rather it should promote the idea that internal motivation is a
separate and important aspect of the moral self to distinguish from moral centrality. Krettenauer
and Victor (2017) found an increase in internal moral identity motivation, as well as a decrease
in external motivation, in older age groups. In the current study, the reasons and motivations
behind the participants’ perceived moral identity change were examined using a similar
methodology.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The first goal of this study was to examine perceived change in moral identity over time.
Based on previous research into moral identity development in adult populations, as well as the
maturity principle (Roberts & Wood, 2006) it is expected that participants will see themselves as
more moral than their past selves, and thus there should be a relative increase in the importance
of moral values. In addition, the role of age in this relationship will be examined as the study will
sample adults from a wide age-range. Since the older adults will be temporally distant from the
identity development of adolescence, it can be expected that some age groups will see less

SELF-CHANGE AND MORALITY

20

change in themselves as compared to the younger age groups. This would also be in accordance
with findings suggesting a trend towards self-perceived stability in older adults (Ryff, 1991).
The second goal of this study is to examine the reasons for moral identity change as given
by participants. With Krettenauer and Victor (2017) finding age related changes in the reasons
given for selecting the self-importance of moral values, similar findings are expected with the
reasons given for change in moral values. Specifically, as they likely experience less
environmental or life-affecting changes (e.g., graduation, marriage, children, first house
purchase), it is expected that older participants will give more internal reasons for change, and
fewer external reasons for change, as compared to younger groups.
The final goal of the study is to explore participants’ perception of change going forward.
Will participants expect changes to their moral identity in the future, and would any changes be
positively received? This is potentially the most telling aspect of the research as it could provide
the parallel structure needed to make the connection between perceived changes in morality and
holding an implicit self-theory of morality.
Method
Participants
The current study uses a combination of previously reported and novel variables from the
same dataset as Krettenauer et al. (2016) and Krettenauer and Victor (2017), but omits the
youngest group (adolescents) contained therein. Participants for this study are 185 individuals
(107 female, 58.5%) ranging from 19.08 years to 69.75 years (Mage = 39.45, SD = 16.04), drawn
from a mid-sized southern Ontario community. The sampling procedure recruited participants
from three separate age groups: Emerging Adulthood (19-25 years, N = 52, 55.8% female),
Young Adulthood (26-45 years, N = 66, 65.2% female), and Middle Age (46-65 years, N = 67,
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52.2 % female). Of the participants, 79.2% indicated they were born in Canada, with a broad
distribution of other countries being represented. Participants were recruited though
advertisements in the local newspaper, online postings about the survey, and flyers distributed at
community events.
All participants provided informed consent prior to participation. This project was
reviewed and approved by a university research ethics board and all participants were treated in
accordance with Tri-Council ethical standards. As the analyses in this study were exploratory
and performed on a previously collected dataset, no calculations for determining power or
sample size were done.
Measures
The measures used for this study were all extracted from an interview, which was a
modified version of the Good Self-Assessment (Arnold, 1993). The modifications included
updating the values available to the participants, and the addition of context specificity. Similar
to Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale, the Good SelfAssessment makes use of a standard set of eight moral values (fair, truthful, kind, respectful,
loyal, compassionate, sincere, and generous). However, to further expand the definition of moral
identity, and to allow for individual differences, participants were allowed to choose from a list
of value attributes that they would use to define a moral person. The values provided were 80
values derived from previous studies into prototypical moral values (see Krettenauer et al.,
2016), and participants were allowed to select their own 12-15 values that, in their opinion,
defined a highly moral person. These values were then used in the completion of the moral
identity diagrams. The diagrams consisted of three concentric circles, with the centre
representing the core of the self-concept (recorded as 4 = very important to me), for the most
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important of the values, and each larger circle representing decreasing importance to the self (see
Figure 1). Any values that were placed outside of the circles were rated as 1 = not important to
me.
Participants were first asked to place the selected values on the diagrams so that they
represented the relative importance of the traits to themselves, with the smaller circles
representing increasing importance. There were diagrams for three different social contexts
(family, work/school, community/society) that were presented consecutively in random order.
Moral identity scores were calculated for each context, and then averaged to obtain the mean
level of moral identity for the present. After a discussion of the current placement of the values,
the interviewer initiated a discussion about changes in moral identity experienced over time.
After this brief orientation discussion, the interviewer removed the values from the diagrams,
and asked the participant to think of themselves 20 years ago (or age 15 for younger participants,
whichever was older). The interviewer proceeded to ask the participant to again place the values
on the diagrams, but as if they were their past selves. These responses were recorded and used in
the calculation of a past moral identity.
Coding
From these responses specific follow-up questions were asked about any differences in
moral identity scores or placements of moral traits. These questions included directly inquiring
as to why the participants thought they changed, and what might have brought about the changes.
The responses were coded into situational, maturational, experiential, and internal, as these
categories were thought to adequately describe the general reasons behind possible changes,
while closely resembling the range of motivations from external to internal present in SelfDetermination Theory. The situational code refers to when the participant indicates that the
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changes are due to environmental changes, rather than personal changes. Therefore, changes in
their moral values and identity are seen as due to a change in employment, or change in family
structure. An example of this would be:
I think I was just overwhelmed at 20. I was working 2 jobs, I was in school full time, I
was barely able to make ends meet. I felt like I didn't have a spare minute. I just, I
remember those years like it was, I just remember running from one job to the next, to
school, to back, and trying to pay bills, and it was just/ I felt exhausted and spent. And I
don't think it was as important to me to demonstrate like loving attributes at that stage in
my life. It was more about survival.
The maturational code indicates that the participant feels that the changes in moral identity are
due to maturation, or simple passage of time, such as the participant who said:
I think because as a, like, as I was younger, a teenager, I didn't really feel the, like/ I
didn't understand the importance of jobs. It was more like, yeah if I don't like it, I can
switch. But nowadays I realise that, ok, I'm older now, so I have to be more tolerant, like
I have to be more understanding because I can't just switch jobs all the time. Too old for
that (laughs).
The experiential code indicates an internal contemplation, but initiated by an external factor. An
example of this code would be:
Oh, when I was in my 20's I was away in college, and our family went through about 8
years where we didn't talk a whole lot. So these, these things were not as important to me
at the time, but I realised shortly after I came back from college that, you know, it's
absolutely my responsibility to display these things in order for our family to reunite, and,
and to grow. So, I guess, you know, I had to get broken down a little bit, and learn how to
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be a bit more humble, and, and then I was able to come home as a, I think, a better
person, where I understood and appreciated that these are values that are essential in any
family dynamic. But prior to my 20's, I don't think that I had an appreciation as much for
these attributes, which is very sad.
Finally, the internal code indicates change that is self-driven, and self-directed. It was usually
described as a spontaneous, deliberate, change after reflection, as in the following passage from
an interview:
I was raised in a Catholic family, actually. And I converted to Islam about … last May,
that’s when it was. So over the years … like, in my teens, I didn’t follow any particular
religion. And I was doing things that were, you know, I guess you could say against the
law. [Laughs] So I guess that’s why law abiding is in the outskirts. Mostly, I didn’t really
care. I didn’t really see the importance. But over the years, I guess, I just started really …
I started learning more. I got into things like philosophy. Just, like, you know, nothing too
intense but … and just more contemplating on things like God, why am I the way that I
am, why do I do the things that I do. And eventually, long story short, I converted to
Islam. [Laughs]
Three coders were used to assess the responses. The Fleiss’ Kappa for multiple rater agreement
proved to be only fair (κ = .282), and while this is clearly less than ideal, it is still far above the
threshold for being simply due to chance (z = 10.435, p < .001). Examination of the reliability
via Cohen’s Weighted Kappa suggested that two of the raters showed a noticeably greater rate of
agreement (κ = .555) than when the third rater was involved (κ = .309, κ = .396). All responses
were discussed among the three coders until unanimous agreement was achieved. The agreed
upon code was recorded in the data set. To simplify the coding and more closely resemble the
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categorizations in self-determination theory, the experiential and internal codes were combined
to form a single internal coding, and the situational coding was relabeled as external. These
variables were initially calculated as count scores (Internal - M = .827, SD = .990; External - M =
.643, SD = .829). However, only 50% of respondents provided reasons for change in all three
contexts of family, work/school, and community/society, with an average number of responses
given at M = 2.13 (SD = .962). Thus, in order to account for missing data, and to better
determine an individual’s propensity for internal or external reasons for change, the proportion
for each was calculated from the total number of reasons for change given across the three
contexts. While this aggregation served to provide a better theoretical foundation for comparing
internal and external reasons for change, unfortunately it also served to lower the inter-rater
reliability. For the internal reasons for change the Fleiss’ Kappa the value was poor (κ = .113),
but still significantly different from chance. Similar to the count scores, two individual raters had
a considerably higher agreement (κ = .343), but the score was reduced when the third rater was
involved. While the external reasons for change had a higher level of agreement (κ = .213), it
was still only fair at best, and again brought down by the inclusion of rater number three (2
Raters κ = .390).
The final portion of the interview consisted of the interviewer asking whether the
participant expected their values (i.e., moral identity) to change over the next 15-20 years. A
separate coding scheme was then developed for this question, indicating the participant’s
expectation of overall change to their moral identity. While it was not formally prompted, many
of the participants went on to express a desire for change, or a desire for no change (stability),
and therefore this was added to the coding scheme. Thus, the coding for this question fell along
two axes: whether the participants believed they would change (no, maybe, yes) with reliability
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between two raters of κ = .543, and whether they expressed any desire to change (desire for
stability, no expressed desire, desire for change) with a reliability of κ = .582. Using these two
coded variables (r = .634), a construct variable was created to combine them, and capture the
participants’ general orientation towards future change in moral identity. Those that expected
future change, and either clearly expressed a desire for change, or a neutral attitude towards
change were categorized as having an overall positive view of future moral identity change (n =
75). Those that did not expect change and either expressed a desire for stability, or had no
expressed desire, were categorized as having a negative view of change (n = 46). All others were
categorized as being ambivalent towards change (n = 63).
Results
Moral Identity Ratings
To assess the self-reported change in moral identity across the three contexts, a mixedmodel ANOVA was run, with Time (Past, Present) as a within subject factor, and Age Group
(Emerging Adults, Young Adults, Middle Age) as the between-subjects factor. This analysis
revealed a main effect of Time, F (1,181) = 96.779, p < .001, η2 = .348, as well as a two-way
interaction between Time and Age Group F (2,181) = 9.795, p < .001, η2 = .098. Post hoc
Bonferroni tests (p < .05) indicated that all three age groups had significant differences between
past and present scores, but with effect sizes of d = 1.030 for Emerging Adults, d = 1.020 for
Young Adults, and d = 0.333 for Middle Age, the smaller magnitude of effect in the middle age
group illustrates the interaction nicely. The dependent variable means for moral identity are
reported in Table 1.
A moral identity change score was calculated, with the moral identity score the
participants indicated for their past selves subtracted from their current moral identity score from
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the same interview. Thus, an increase in this variable would indicate an increase in the
importance placed on moral identity. The change score ranged from -.52 to 2.04, with MChange =
.307, SD = .454. Using this new variable participants were grouped by the amount and direction
of change in moral identity score from past to present. The first group consisted of all
participants who had a score below zero; that is they scored their past moral identity as more
important to their past selves (stronger), than their current moral identity was to them now. This
was the case for 21.6% (n = 40) of participants (MChange = -.128, SD = .100). The second group
were those that scored between 0 and the average score for the variable, MChange = .307. This
group consisted of 78 participants (42%), with 9 participants having a score of 0, indicating no
change. The final group were those who scored above the mean score for the variable, which
consisted of 66 participants (36.4%).
A cross tabulation of these Moral Identity change groupings with the age groups within
the study was produced. Of the participants in Group 1 (negative score), the smallest number
were in the Emerging Adult category (n = 7), with the middle Age group having the most (n =
19), and the Young Adult group falling in the middle (n = 14). In Group 2 (below average
positive score) the two youngest age groups are approximately equally represented (EA – n = 20;
YA – n = 19), while the Middle Age category has far more individuals (n = 39). This pattern is
reversed in the case of Group 3 (Above average positive score) (EA – n = 24; YA – n = 33; MA
– n = 9).
Reasons for Change
The proportion scores for internal and external reasons for change, while not being
directly dependent on each other, are significantly correlated r = -.573, p < .001. These two
scores were used as dependent variables in a multivariate ANOVA, with age group as the
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between-subjects factor. This analysis failed to produce a significant overall multivariate result
ΛWilks = .953, F (4, 318) = 1.933, p = .105, η2 = .024. Although this result is not significant, due
to the strong negative correlation between the dependent variables univariate tests were run as
exploratory measures. Within these univariate tests there was a significant effect of age for the
external proportion of reasons given, F (2, 159) = 3.075, p = .049, η2 = .037. A difference
contrast was run with the youngest age group (emerging adults) as the reference group (1, -1, 0;
1, 1, -2). This contrast revealed that for the internal reasons for change variable, neither the two
youngest age groups (p = .219) nor the oldest age group (p = .703) differed. For the external
reasons for change variable the oldest age group was significantly different from the other two
groups p = .015, while the two younger age groups did not differ from each other (p = .236).
A categorical variable was created to address the previously detected patterns of moral
identity change (Negative change, n = 34; Below average positive change, n = 70; and Above
average positive change, n = 58). This new variable was then used as a between subjects variable
in a multivariate ANCOVA with the reasons for change proportion scores as the dependent
variable and the exact age of participants as the covariate. These calculated scores gave an
indication as to what portion of the time individuals gave an internal or external reason for
change. Thus, a score of 1.00 for the internal code indicated that the participant always gave an
internal reason for the observed change in moral identity. This omnibus multivariate analysis
produced a significant overall effect, F (4, 316) = 2.894, p = .022, η2 = .035, with the covariate
being non-significant in both dependent variables. However, the covariate did approach
significance in the external reasons for change F (1, 158) = 3.478, p = .064, η2 = .022. In the tests
of between subject effects, the external reasons for change proportion score was not significant F
(2, 158) = .574, p = .564, η2 = .007, but there was a significant result for the internal reasons for
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change proportion score, F (2, 158) = 3.743, p = .026, η2 = .045. An a priori simple contrast (-1,
1, 0; -1, 0, 1) suggested that this effect was driven by a significant difference between the below
average change group and the negative change group Δ = -.171, SE = .083, p = .041, with the
above average positive change group not differing from the negative change group Δ = .010, SE
= .090, p = .915 (Negative Change M = .466, SE = .069; Below Average Change M = .294, SE =
.048; Above Average Change M = .475, SE = .055). This would indicate that the group that
indicated relatively little change in their moral identity centrality gave the least amount of
internal reasons for change as compared to both the group with negative change, and above
average positive change.
Future Change
To examine whether the participants’ views on future change would affect their ratings of
moral identity in the past and present, two coded variables were developed: The first assessed the
participants’ expectation as to whether change would occur to their moral identity in the future,
and the second one their desire for either change or stability to their moral identity. While these
two codes are markedly similar, as can be seen from the raw count of participants in Table 2, the
variance between the two suggested that they were not interchangeable. Upon further
investigation the amount of agreement between the two variables was κ = .426.
These two variables were then combined to capture individuals’ overall perception of
future change: category 1 is those have a negative view of change (n = 46), category 2 is those
ambivalent to change (n = 63), and category 3 is those who have a positive view of future change
(n = 75). Using this composite variable, a univariate ANOVA was run to determine if there was
an effect of the three different views of future change on the dependent variable of participant
age. A significant main effect was found F (2, 181) = 7.351, p = .001, η2 = .075 and post hoc
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Bonferroni comparisons (p < .05) revealed that the negative view of change group was
significantly older than the other two groups, which did not differ from each other.
The next analysis done with this new variable was a mixed-model ANOVA on the mean
level of moral identity, with Time (Past, Present) as the within-subjects variable and View of
Change (Rejects Change, Ambivalent to Change, Embraces Change) as the between-subjects
factor. This analysis revealed significant main effects for Time, F (1,181) = 75.676, p < .001, η2
= .295, as well as View of Change F (2,181) = 3.536, p = .031, η2 = .038. Post hoc paired t-tests
indicated all three groups had significant differences between past and present moral identity
scores, but with the negative view of change group having the smallest effect size of d = .473, as
compared to d = .890 for the ambivalent to change group, or d = .800 for the positive view of
change group. Means for the dependent variables of past and present moral identity are presented
in Table 3.
In the interest of exploring the effects of age on the previous analysis, the exact age of
participants was added as a covariate. The resulting ANCOVA produced a significant Time x
Age interaction, F (1,180) = 14.908, p < .001, η2 = .076. However, the addition of the covariate
rendered the previously significant effect for View of Change non-significant, F (2,180) = 1.050,
p = .352, η2 = .012.
Discussion
The goal of the current study was to examine participants’ own perception of change to
their moral identity over time, and any perceived reasons why these changes might have
occurred. While there has been some preliminary research done to support the idea that
individuals do experience changes to their moral identity beyond the periods of adolescence or
emerging adulthood, it was hoped that by asking participants to provide their own ratings, and
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reasons for any changes, a new perspective would be gained. By using the maturity principle, as
well as temporal self-appraisal theory as guidelines, it was expected that while participants
would see moral identity as more important to their current self-concept as compared to their
past self, this effect would most likely decrease in the older age groups, possibly even
approaching stability.
To this end, evidence was provided that indeed, the oldest age group reported less change
than the younger groups. Additionally, they had a higher number of individuals reporting
negative change. This trend, while not expected, would seem to be in line with previous research
into self-reports of well-being, where older adults largely indicated an expectation of stability
when examining prior levels (Ryff, 1991). With moral identity, as with well-being, this would
suggest an expectation that older individuals view themselves as closer to an ideal self. In other
words, they may see themselves as past the stage of personal development, as compared to those
in younger age groups who may see their development as a more recent process, or one that is
still ongoing. It is important to note however, that in all three age groups there were participants
that perceived stability in their moral identity, as well as a group that perceived decline. If we
view this result using the lens of temporal self-appraisal theory (Ross & Wilson, 2003), which
posits that people are motivated to appraise their past selves in a way that makes their current
self feel good, this could suggest a decreased importance placed upon those moral values, or
possibly moral identity itself. However, it may also indicate the presence of an individual who
views change in a less positive light.
When further examining the reasons for change, there again appears to be an age-related
trend in which participants from the oldest age group expressed more external reasons for
change. While this relationship may be tenuous, it can reasonably be expected that in older adults
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stability may be more desirable, especially as compared to decline, and thus rather than view
themselves as changing, they see any changes as due to external factors. With the group showing
below average positive change having a significantly lower proportion of internal reasons given,
this may provide additional support for the notion that there is a significant proportion of the
sample that views change negatively. It may also suggest that moral identity change is related to
internal motivation, in that greater internal motivation is associated with larger changes, either
positive or negative, to one’s moral identity.
The idea that some individuals perceived change as negative can further be seen in the
results from the views on future change. The group that indicated negative views of future
change had a significantly higher average age as compared to the other groups, and this is
reinforced by the results showing that the negative view of change group had less perceived
moral identity development than the other two groups, but that this effect was rendered nonsignificant when accounting for age of the participants. It can clearly be seen that older
participants had a dimmer view of change, and this can be seen as potentially explaining the
decrease in perceived moral identity change, as well as the increase in external reasons for
change.
As the maturity principle posits that individuals develop towards maturity, this may
provide additional evidence that those in the oldest age group see themselves as having reached
maturity, and are no longer in need of further development. However, it can also be argued from
the data that an important aspect of personality is the view one takes towards change. As all age
groups contained individuals who perceived no (or very little) change, as well as those who
perceived negative change, it may be that one’s view on the positivity of change in general is an
important factor to consider, and it is not only older adults who may view change as negative.

SELF-CHANGE AND MORALITY

33

While the study presented here provides some important details in regards to individuals’
perceptions of their own moral identity development, it is important to note that the data used
here to determine the past moral identity is subjective, and thus subject to the constraints outlined
in temporal self-appraisal theory. Individuals may, according to how much importance they place
on morality in general, overestimate the amount of change they have undergone (Wilson & Ross,
2001). Further to this, participants’ moral identity was not actually measured at two different
time periods, instead relying on the individuals to effectively rate their past selves. These ratings
may be subject to presentation biases, with participants wanting to make their current self seem
more moral, and thus consciously rating their past selves as less moral. This would potentially
cause inflated scores of moral change. Similarly, as it is not longitudinal in design, we cannot
speak to actual individual trajectories of development over time. In addition, the overall
structure of the study is cross-sectional, and subject to potential cohort effects. These may be
particularly strong in the case where the groups encompass such a wide age range. With the
youngest age group potentially still being in post-secondary education, this may provide a stark
contrast to the life-situation of the middle age group who would encompass those either retired,
or close to it. Along similar lines, the structure of the age groups meant that the time intervals
used for the past selves was not uniform. While the two oldest age groups could plausibly
imagine themselves 20 years younger, the emerging adult group was asked to imagine
themselves as age 15, which on average was approximately seven years prior, and no more than
10 years prior. This disparity in timeframe may be acceptable in terms of meaningful life
changes that occur over that particular time period however it may not provide an accurate view
of a developmental trajectory. To address this concern, some form of longitudinal research
would be ideal. In addition, some groupings were developed post data collection, leading to
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disparity in group sizes. While this was not a problem statistically for the analyses discussed, it
did prevent some more complex analyses from being performed. Future studies may wish to
expand the sample size with this concern in mind.
In conclusion, the data presented here provides an interesting and seldom sought out view
of moral identity development: the changes undergone as perceived by the individuals
themselves. This allowed an opportunity to view the decrease in amount of perceived change
with increased age that provides further nuance to the findings of Krettenauer et al. (2016), in
that while moral identity may in fact continue to develop into the period of middle age, its rate of
change may not remain constant. Furthermore, it may be that the reasons for perceived change
may shift to more externally driven change, and may be moderated by the individuals’ views on
change in general.
These findings contribute to the overall aims of this program of research by identifying
individuals all along a clear spectrum of views on self-change. We see the greatest proportion of
individuals embracing change, although to different degrees, along with a substantial proportion
of those who view change as negative. These beliefs about change do seem to relate to actual
change in moral identity scores, in that those that see change as positive report higher amounts of
it, especially in emerging adults. This attribution would also seem to be somewhat self-serving,
as those experiencing positive change attribute it to more internal reasons. Finally, there would
seem to be some kind of age-independent relationship between viewing future change as less
desirable and perceiving less change from their past selves, the nature of that relationship
requires further elaboration.
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Chapter 3

Moral Self-Theory, Moral Identity, and Moral Motivation
One of the findings from study 1 that became particularly salient was the emergence of a
distinct group that either (1) self-reported a decline in moral identity over their past selves; or (2)
reported future changes as unlikely or undesired. This finding raised questions as to the necessity
of viewing change as a positive occurrence. For instance, if the choice an individual faces is
between stability and decline, then stability would seem to be the better choice. While this may
seem to be a pessimistic view of the future for the individual, it would serve as motivation to
view change in a more negative light. The fact that there are those who have differing views on
the value and necessity of change in the context of their moral identity would not seem to be in
question.
The question this does raise is how these different views of change affect moral
motivation, and especially moral behaviour. In order to examine this question further, it will be
useful to explore a theory that contrasts individuals’ view of an aspect of their self-concept as
either an entity or incremental. Dweck’s Implicit Self-Theory has been used widely in the fields
of education and intelligence, but only rarely in morality. If this theory of self-change is
combined with that of moral identity, the potential for differing motivations, and behaviour
patterns, becomes clearer. The purpose of the second study is to systematically explore the
theory of self-change in the specific context of morality alongside established moral identity and
moral motivation measures, and to examine the relationships between these variables and moral
behaviour.
Self-Views on Change
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For some, the necessity of change may seem self-evident, however study 1 of this
program makes it clear that when it comes to moral self-concept, there are many who see
themselves as stable across time and situations: as unchanging. While in many cases constraining
our conceptualization of individual differences to binary opposing options such as change versus
constant seems overly simplistic, in the case of our self-concept, it may in fact be not only valid,
but very useful. Dweck’s paper published in 1995 deals with measurement of these opposing
mindsets in terms of the stability of one’s core attributes: intelligence, personality, and morality.
Dweck termed these two belief types: entity theorists, who see their attributes as static and
unlikely to change, and incremental theorists, who see their attributes as malleable and changing.
Entity theorists see themselves and the world around them as unchanging, and even
unchangeable. They are often seen as being predisposed for expressing a helplessness orientation
in the face of adversity or failure. Opposing these entity theorists are the incremental theorists.
They see themselves and the world as changing and changeable. They are more likely to show a
mastery orientation in response to failure, and have been shown to have increased internal
motivation over time (Dweck et al., 1995). Dweck’s theory is far reaching, and very popular.
However, while examining morality using this approach is not unheard of (e.g., Gerber &
O’Connell, 2012; Miller et al., 2007), the vast majority of studies that cite her literature are
dealing with either the global application, that an individual’s general personality can or cannot
be changed, or the second of the triad of measures: intelligence.
Social psychology has taken hold of the theory and repeatedly shown the effects of
having an incremental self-theory in such areas as environmental engagement (Soliman &
Wilson, 2017), psychological well-being (e.g. Bernecker et al., 2017; Schroder et al., 2017),
sexuality and relationship well-being (e.g. Maxwell, et al. 2017), emotion regulation (e.g.
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Gutentag et al., 2017), job performance (Zingoni & Corey, 2017), and athletic ability (Mascret et
al., 2016), for a brief list. Likewise, educational psychology has shown the benefits of an
incrementalist view in overall academic success (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2007; Good et al., 2003),
maintenance of internal motivation (Haimovitz et al., 2011), academic effort (Zingoni & Byron,
2017), value placed on school (e.g., Schutte et al., 2017), and writing skill (e.g., Limpo & Alves,
2014). The few studies to have directly utilized an Implicit Self-Theory measure for morality,
either through the use of the morality-worded questions (Chiu et al., 1997), or through situational
context (Wurthmann, 2017), did so in the context of moral reasoning and judgments. They did so
and found evidence that entity moral theorists held to more duty-based beliefs, while incremental
moral theorists held more rights-based beliefs. Unfortunately, these relationships between the
moral form of Implicit Self-Theory and moral reasoning were never extended as far as
examining their effects on moral behaviour.
In returning to Dweck’s original publication from 1995, what seems obvious is what has
not been studied; the third measure, the application of Implicit Self-Theory to morality. A follow
up paper from Chiu and colleagues (1997) makes morality a central focus in the study of implicit
theories, and according to a literature search in April of 2022 on ProQuest, has been cited
approximately 360 times. Additionally, a recent publication has translated a Moral Growth
Mindset measure from Korean, and found good reliability and validity, while remaining distinct
from moral identity internalization and measures of incremental thinking in regards to
intelligence (Han et al., 2020). So while there is clearly a foundation for exploring the role of
Implicit Self-Theories of morality, very few studies extend to the effects of holding an
incremental mindset of moral behaviour. While this research provides evidence that individuals’
do perceive their morality as malleable, other research may provide an argument that this is not
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always the case. Strohminger and Nichols (2014) found evidence that moral traits are seen as
essential to the person individuals see themselves to be – their self-concept. Any change in their
morality is seen as a fundamental change in the person they are. Thus, individuals may change a
host of other physical and mental traits and remain, at their core, the same person; but a change
to their moral traits incites a view that they have fundamentally changed. This lay theory view of
the essentialism of morality could provide an alternative view on the malleability of the moral
self-concept, in that it not only shows how important stability can be to our moral self-concept,
but how difficult changes to it might be. If we see our moral selves as an integral part of core
identity, we may not view change as positive. Further to this, any anticipated change to our
morality may be seen as a negative event or process. What it does not do however, is give us a
good indication as to how an individual’s willingness to change to their moral self-concept will
fare in predicting moral behaviour when compared with other predictors of moral behaviour such
as moral identity or moral motivation.
Predictors of Moral Behaviour
One of the most popular predictors of moral behaviour over the last 20 years has been
moral identity. Usually captured through Aquino and Reed’s (2002) Self-Importance of Moral
Identity measure, this construct is generally defined as the degree to which an individual has
integrated morality into their self-concept, or sense of identity. While there is little doubt as to
the existence of a relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour (Hertz & Krettenauer,
2016), the moderate size of this effect leaves room for other explanatory factors, as well as
moderation of the effect. One of the hallmarks of moral identity, as it is currently measured, is
supposed to be internal consistency. In fact, this was one of the founding facets of moral identity
when it was initially proposed to bridge the perceived gap between moral reasoning and moral
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behaviour (Blasi, 1980; 1983). Along with internal consistency and integration, it can be
assumed that a motivation for moral action would then arise from a desire for this now
internalized consistency. Krettenauer (2011) described this moral motivation derived from an
internalized moral identity as internal moral motivation, partly to distinguish it from externally
motivated moral action, such as that motivated by fear of punishment. It was found that internal
moral motivation was significantly correlated with the measure of moral identity used, but that
external moral motivation was negatively correlated with it. This dichotomization of motivation
into internal versus external also mirrors the subscales in Aquino and Reed’s Self-Importance of
Moral Identity measure (2002). Their internalization subscale seems to focus on internally
motivated reasons for being moral, while their symbolization subscale would seem to capture a
more external reasoning. It is important to note, that while Aquino and Reed (2002) consistently
champion the use of the scale as a whole, a meta-analysis into moral identities use as a predictor
of moral behaviour found that the use of only the internalization subscale was popular (Hertz &
Krettenauer, 2016).
The distinction between internal and external moral motivation is derived from SelfDetermination Theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1980, 2012; Ryan & Connell, 1989), which
categorizes different motivations for behaviour by their causal locality, as either internal or
external to the self. While measures of moral identity may correlate positively with measures of
internal moral motivation, and negatively with external moral motivation, these are clearly not
completely overlapping constructs, and thus should be included, or at least accounted for, in a
discussion of possible predictors of moral behaviour. As they may independently predict moral
behaviour, and possibly interact with moral identity, it is important to account for both internal
moral motivation and external moral motivation.
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Prosocial vs. Antisocial Behaviour
When discussing moral behaviour, it is important to draw a distinction between the two
types of behaviour commonly thought to represent moral behaviour: antisocial behaviour, in
which the moral behaviour is to avoid engaging in certain actions; and prosocial behaviour, in
which the moral behaviour is to engage in the specific action. Not only do these actions differ in
terms of obligation for engaging in (or avoiding) the behaviour (Kahn, 1992), but they seem to
be rooted in different motivational properties (see Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). Additionally, this
can be viewed as the difference between simply avoiding harmful behaviour (antisocial), or the
active engagement in helpful behaviour (prosocial). What can be seen throughout the currently
available research would support this distinction, as morality constructs consistently affect
prosocial and antisocial behaviour differently (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). This raises the
question as to whether holding a view of morality as malleable would differentially affect
prosocial versus antisocial behaviour.
In the current study the relationship between individuals’ self-views on change and moral
behaviour, in both the prosocial and antisocial context, is examined. In addition, measures for
both internal and external moral motivation are included to determine if self-views of change can
account for any motivational effects. With the combination of these factors, people’s views on
the malleability of morality should play some role in predicting their moral behaviour. Previous
studies have reported that holding an incremental view of morality can lead to a decrease in
negative attributions for others, as well as increased tolerance (Levontin et al., 2013). Holding an
entity view of morality however tends to increase punitiveness (Tam et al., 2013), as well as
hostile intent attributions for others, hostile intent, and aggressive desires (Yeager et al., 2013a).
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Additionally, those with incremental morality seem to be able to more likely to accept
responsibility for transgressions (Schmann & Dweck, 2014).
Moral Self-Theory and Behaviour
Considering these findings, as well as the findings from Chapter 2, certain expectations
for the current study can be put forward. While these will be more akin to research questions
than hypotheses, they can nonetheless help to direct our exploration. First, there is evidence to
suggest that perceiving the moral self-concept as malleable may have a relationship with the
willingness to engage in moral behaviour. The majority of evidence suggests that this effect is
likely to increase the likelihood of moral behaviour, similar to the beneficial effects of holding an
incremental view of intelligence. It has been shown that moral self-theory as a construct is
independent of political ideology (Han et al., 2022), which would suggest that it is independent
of actual moral beliefs. However this does not provide an indication as to whether it will impact
behaviour. Furthermore, whether it will affect both prosocial and antisocial behaviour in the
same manner, or to the same degree, remains an open question. Previous research has suggested
that different views on the malleability of morality may affect motivations for (im)moral action
through its relationship with moral disengagement and differing relationships with moral identity
internalization and symbolization (Han et al., 2020), therefore it would also be important to
explore potential interactive effects with moral identity measures, as well as other forms of moral
motivation. Finally, there is an opportunity to explore the possibility of developmental changes,
not only in the variables themselves, but in their relationships as well, with the collection of data
from multiple age groups.
If we again look to research into implicit theory of intelligence or personality, we see that
there is a core assumption that endorsement of either an entity view or incrementalist view of
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intelligence does not change with age (Dweck et al., 1995). Additionally, several intervention
studies have shown that without intervention, participants’ implicit theories do not change
(Blackwell et al., 2007; Yeager et al., 2014) with interventions serving to reduce the endorsement
of an entity theory in participants. However, when a longer timeframe is viewed, we see a
different pattern emerge. First, there is evidence for an increase of entity (trait) attributions
across early elementary school (Grades K – 4; Benenson & Dweck, 1986), but also evidence of
higher endorsement for entity views in high school as compared to elementary school (Age range
10 years 5 months to 13 years 8 months; Leonardi & Gialamas, 2002). This discrepancy would
suggest the need for a more diverse sample with regards to age. While the current study would be
correlational, it is nonetheless the first time age-related differences have been explored in the
moral realm of implicit self-theory.
Method
Participants
The sample for this study comprised of 239 participants (132 female), recruited from
three age groups: early adolescence (EA; Gr. 5/6, 10-12 years), middle adolescence (MA; Gr.
9/10, 14-16 years), and late adolescence/emerging adulthood (LA; University, 18-26). The mean
age of the overall sample was 15.76 years (SD = 3.52). A complete breakdown of the
demographic information for the overall sample and subsamples is available in Table 4. For this
study, sample size was constrained by the difficulties in recruiting school age children in a
limited time frame. In an attempt to keep the sample as balanced as possible, recruitment for the
oldest age group was limited to approximately the same size as the larger of the two school age
groups, the Grade 9/10 group.
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The participants were recruited from a mid-sized city in southern Ontario. Participants in
the early adolescent and middle adolescent groups were recruited through the Catholic School
Board, from either elementary school (early adolescence) or high school (middle adolescence).
An information letter was sent home along with a consent form for the parents/guardians. The
emerging adult sample was collected from a mid-size university in the same municipality, and
consisted of primarily first- and second-year students. All elementary and high school students
completed the survey using personal computers in the classroom or library of their school, during
school hours. University students were recruited and participated through the online research
experience program administered by the psychology department. Participants who were not of
legal age, that is those in early and middle adolescence, provided verbal assent in addition to
parental consent prior to participation. Consent was obtained directly from participants in the
emerging adult sample.
Measures
Self-Importance of Moral Identity
The first measure was a slightly modified version of Aquino & Reed’s (2002) SelfImportance of Moral Identity (SIMI), similar to that which was used in Chapter 2. This measure
lists nine traits, and asks participants to imagine an individual with all of these traits, then
respond to 10 questions that relate to themselves as potentially that person (e.g., it would make
me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics). The 10 items comprise two subscales
of five questions each, five for the internalization subscale, and five for the symbolization
subscale. The responses are presented in 5-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree).
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The modification for the current study replaces the values utilized in the original
measure, with those found by Krettenauer, Murua, and Jia (2016) to most often be used by
participants in describing a highly moral person. For the complete sample, the reliability for the
internalization subscale was  = .68, and for the symbolization subscale was  = .73. The lower
reliability score for internalization was mainly driven by the youngest age group, as it increased
considerably in the older two groups (EA α = .516; MA α = .694; LA α = .742). Interestingly,
this same pattern was not seen in symbolization, although there was some variability between
groups (EA α = .651; MA α = .797; LA α = .682). Additionally, the lower reliability for the
internalization scale is similar to the results found in the publication for the original SIMI scale,
which produced reliability scores of  = .73 for internalization and  = .83 for symbolization
(Aquino & Reed, 2002).
Self-Views on Change
The measure used here for the views of moral-self change was based on the measure
developed by Dweck, Chiu, and Hong (1995) to assess an individual’s views on their ability to
change key aspects of their self-concept. The sub-measures in the current study each consist of
three items, and seek to address an individual’s views on their ability to change their own
intelligence (IST-I; α = .874), their own morality, and people’s ability to change their morality in
general. In the original version of the morality measure, the questions referred to a person’s
morality. For the purposes of the current study, it was decided that in addition to these items, a
separate set of three parallel items would be used that referred to my morality. In part to see if a
distinction would be made for the different wordings. The original set was termed Moral SelfTheory – Other (MST-Other) and had a reliability of α = .839, with the new items referred to as
Moral Self-Theory – Self (MST-Self) and having an internal consistency of α = .857. For
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example, one of the items from the MST-Self triad would be: My moral character is something
very basic about me and it can't be changed much. In the MST-Other the word my is simply
replaced with the phrase a person’s. An item from the intelligence subscale would read: Your
intelligence is something about you that you can't change very much. As the scales were
originally designed to measure an individual’s preference for entity theory, all items in the
current study were reverse coded so that high scores would indicate a more incremental view
(Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Chiu, et al., 1997).
Self-Determination Theory
The next measure in the battery is a measure of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation based
on the Ryan and Connell (1989) measure. Similar to those used previously (Hardy at al., 2015;
Krettenauer, 2011), the current measure provided participants with six one-sentence scenarios,
for which they were asked to rate the importance of five different reasons for engaging (or not
engaging) in the behaviour presented in the scenario. The scenarios each present a behaviour that
is either engaging in a prosocial behaviour (e.g., returning a lost wallet) or refraining from
antisocial behaviour (e.g., not cheating on a test at school). For each action, five different reasons
are given for the behaviour, derived from self-determination theory. External reasons (α = .773)
are based on consequences of the behaviour that are strictly external to the individual (i.e.,
enforced by a figure of authority). Introjected reasons (α = .814) are based upon external
relationships with others, and any possible consequences to the relationship. Identified reasons (α
= .830) are meant to express an individual’s agreement with a moral norm, and are the first of the
internal-type reasons. The second internal reason type is integrated (α = .802) which present a
moral norm as a self-ideal that bears personal significance for the individual. Finally, there is the
intrinsic response (α = .823), which represents an entirely internal motivation, where the reason
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for the behaviour is simply personal enjoyment or fulfilment. These categories were taken from
the original measure used by Krettenauer (2011), but to simplify the analyses in interpretation
here, the three internal and two external motivation types were combined into composite scores
for internal motivation (SDT-INT; α = .935) and external motivation (SDT-EXT; α = .876).
Moral Behaviour
The final measure is a checklist used by Krettenauer and Johnston (2011) of 30 prosocial
and antisocial behaviours that the participants are requested to indicate how often in the past year
they have engaged in the actions. The measure is comprised of 20 antisocial items (α = .833) and
10 prosocial items (α = .839). Prosocial items include: Visited or helped out people who were
sick, and Participated in or helped a charity organization. Antisocial items include: Intentionally
damaged or destroyed people’s private property, and Failed to return other people’s belongings.
The scale used for the ratings was 1 – Never did this, to 4 – Did this several times. Items were
then summed to create scores for both types of moral behaviour, with a higher score in either
measure representing an increase in the behaviour reported.
Results
As this study’s purpose is to explore views on self-change in the moral domain, the first
part of these analyses examines the Moral Self-Theory measures themselves, with particular
focus on the internal consistency and how they relate to other measures. The second section
examines the roles played by MST and the other variables in predicting moral behaviour, both
prosocial and antisocial. The other variables of interest are: The age of participants, the
internalization and symbolism subscales of the Self-Importance of Moral Identity scale (SIMI;
Aquino & Reed, 2002); Implicit Self-Theory for intelligence (IST-I; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong,
1995); the two subscales for motivation based on Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Connell
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1989); and finally, the scales for retrospective prosocial and antisocial behaviour (Johnston &
Krettenauer, 2011). Means and standard deviations for the variables can be found in Table 5.
Factor Analysis
As the self version of the Moral Self-Theory questions have not yet been compared to the
original (other) version, an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. Additionally, the Implicit
Self-Theory for intelligence (IST-I) items were also included. The procedure used was a
principal component analysis with Promax rotation, as it was expected that any factors obtained
would be correlated with each other, if only due to the similarity of the items structure and
wording.
This factor analysis yielded two factors with an initial Eigenvalue above 1.00. The first
factor was made up of the six Moral Self-Theory items and accounting for 55.6% of the variance,
and the second comprised of the three Intelligence questions representing 14.0% of the variance.
The two components were determined to correlate at r = .556. This pattern of loading is similar
to that presented in Dweck and colleagues (1995) paper, however, the correlation between the
morality and intelligence factors was never reported. As the self and other items loaded on the
same factor, for the purposes of further analyses it was decided to combine them to form a
composite measure for Moral Self-Theory (α = .888). The complete pattern matrix for the factor
analysis is presented in Table 6.
Age Group Differences
To test for any age-related differences, the independent variables of interest (MST, ISTI,
SIMI-Internalization, SIMI-Symbolization, Internal Moral Motivation (SDT-INT), External
Moral Motivation (SDT-EXT)), as well as measures for antisocial and prosocial behaviour were
entered as dependent variables into a MANOVA with the three age groups as levels of a
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between-groups factor. The omnibus MANOVA revealed a significant effect of Age Group F
(16, 460) = 6.643, p < .001, η2 = .19, with significant differences found in Moral Self-Theory F
(2, 236) = 5.647, p = .004, η2 = .046, Internalization F (2, 236) = 3.756, p = .025, η2 = .031,
SDT-EXT F (2, 236) = 6.555, p = .002, η2 = .053, SDT_INT F (2, 236) = 3.731, p = .025, η2 =
.031, antisocial behaviour F (2, 236) = 18.092, p < .001, η2 = .133, and prosocial behaviour F (2,
236) = 5.402, p = .005. η2 = .044. A priori difference contrasts (-1, 1, 0; -1, -1, 2) found that the
youngest age group significantly differed from the middle age group by scoring lower, meaning
they had a less incremental view, for Moral Self-Theory (MST) ΔM = .521, SE = .157, p = .001.
The youngest group also scored lower than the middle age group for antisocial behaviour (ΔM =
.128, SE = .045, p = .005) and prosocial behaviour (ΔM = .335, SE = .103, p = .001), but higher
for internal moral motivation (SDT-INT) ΔM = -.301, SE = .113, p = .008. In addition, the oldest
age group differed from the two younger groups for three variables: they were lower in external
moral motivation (SDT-EXT) ΔM = -.319, SE = .092, p = .001, higher in moral identity
internalization (SIMI-I) ΔM = .187, SE = .083, p = .025, and higher in antisocial behaviour ΔM
= .199, SE = .035, p < .001. Full means and standard deviations are those presented previously in
Table 5.
Bivariate Correlations
To first explore the general relationships between the variables, bivariate correlations
were conducted, with the inclusion of a variable for the age of the participants in years. There are
the expected correlations between the subscales of the SIMI, as well as a strong correlation, r =
.614, between the two forms of motivation (SDT-Int, SDT-Ext). There was also a strong
correlation between the Moral Self-Theory scale and the Intelligence scale, r = .572. This is not
unexpected considering the correlations that have been previously reported between implicit
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personality measures (Cheng & Hau, 2003; Spinath et al., 2003). Additionally there are
significant correlations between Moral Identity Internalization and both prosocial (r = .130, p =
.045) and antisocial behaviour (r = -.170, p = .008), whereas Moral Identity Symbolization
shows only a significant correlation with prosocial behaviour (r = .194, p = .003). For the Moral
Motivation (SDT) scales, external moral motivation was positively correlated with moral identity
symbolization (r = .301, p < .001), and negatively correlated with age (r = -1.88, p = .004).
Internal moral motivation was correlated positively with moral identity internalization (r = .261,
p < .001) and symbolization (r = .331, p < .001), as well as both prosocial (r = .186, p = .004)
and antisocial (r = -.263, p < .001) behaviour. Significant positive correlations between prosocial
and antisocial behaviour (r = .222), as well as age and antisocial behaviour (r = .327) should also
be noted. However, this may simply reflect an increased reporting of antisocial behaviour with
age. The summary table is presented in Table 7. The numbers on the diagonal represent the
reliability of each scale or subscale, where appropriate, presented as Cronbach’s Alphas.
Regressions
After the findings of the bivariate correlations, regressions were conducted to further
explore the nature of the relationship between Moral Self-Theory, and other variables for moral
motivation and moral behaviour. First, linear regressions were run for prosocial and antisocial
behaviour respectively as dependent variables. The regression of the exact age, MST, SIMI, and
SDT variables on prosocial behaviour produced a significant overall model, F (6, 232) = 4.176, p
= .001, r2 = .074,1 with MST (β = .137, p = .035), age (β = .148, p = .022) and symbolization (β
= .159, p = .020) as the significant predictors. Interaction terms were added to check for any

1

All r2 values reported in this section represent adjusted r2 values
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potential moderation of the symbolization measure by MST, but the resulting change to the
adjusted r2 value was non-significant. See Table 8 for complete results.
The regression for antisocial behaviour produced a significant overall result F (6,232) =
9.707, p < .001, r2 = .180, with age (β = .346, p < .001), internal moral motivation (β = -.286, p <
.001), and internalization (β = -.149, p = .021) serving as significant predictors. As with prosocial
behaviour, the possibility of moderation was explored with an interaction term for the two SIMI
subscales and MST added in an additional step. This second model provided a significant
increase in variance accounted for, ΔF (2, 230) = 4.831, p = .009, Δr2 = .026, with the interaction
term for MST and internalization proving significant β = .177, p = .003. Age, internal moral
motivation, and internalization remained significant, while external moral motivation, moral
identity symbolization, and the interaction term between symbolization and Moral Self-Theory
were non-significant. Table 9 displays the complete results.
In order to visualize and better understand the interaction between Moral Self-Theory and
moral identity internalization in their relationship with antisocial behaviour, simple slope
analyses were conducted. The analyses indicated that when participants held an incremental
moral self-theory, there was no effect of moral identity internalization β = -.003, t = -.077, p =
.939, but when participants held an entity moral self-theory, there was an effect of moral identity
internalization β = -.254, t = -3.437, p = .001. Plots for the variables were produced using
procedures outlined by Dawson (2014), and Figure 2 depicts the interaction. The low and high
values were defined as those at least 1 SD above or below the mean for the variable, with the
high Moral Self-Theory group representing a more incremental view, and the low group
representing a more entity-based view. In this figure, there is a larger difference between the low
and high Moral Self-Theory groups for those with low moral identity internalization scores, as
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compared to the participants who had higher moral identity internalization scores. This would
indicate an effect of Moral Self-Theory, but only in those participants with a low score on moral
identity internalization.
Discussion
The present study sought to examine the relationship between an individual’s view on
how malleable their moral character is, and variables, including their moral identity, moral
motivation, and moral behaviour. It has been proposed in this chapter that having an incremental
view of morality could possibly act as a moderator of the relationship between moral identity and
moral behaviour. The expectation was that believing one’s moral character was changeable
would provide an individual with an increased effect of holding a strong moral identity,
specifically where morality is seen as a highly internalized and important to the sense of self. As
previous research in the field posits that moral identity develops over the course of adolescence,
the current study examined three age groups, sampling from early adolescence (ages 10-12
years), middle adolescence (14-16 years), and late adolescence/emerging adulthood (18-26
years).
The initial analysis sought to determine whether the wording of the Moral Self-Theory
questions mattered. An exploratory factor analysis suggested that the differing forms of the
questions, whether the questions focused on the individual participant (My moral character), or
had a more general tone that did not reference any specific individual (A person’s moral
character), both tapped into the same latent factor. Some of the earliest research using
incremental theory used the more general form of the question, and it distinguished itself from
incremental views held in other domains, such as intelligence or personality, adequately (Chiu et
al., 1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Later research has shown that while there is the
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necessary distinction between domains, within each domain there is consistency in measurement
such that even when specific attributes within that domain were used, the findings were
applicable to the larger general construct (Hughes, 2015). Furthermore, in the current study
holding an incremental view in one domain was predictive of holding an incremental view in
others. While in this study the domain used for reference and comparison was intelligence, other
research has shown this relationship between morality and personality as well (Hughes, 2015).
This may suggest that when an incremental view of morality is held by an individual, they expect
other aspects of their self-concept to be malleable as well.
In the domain of morality, prosocial and antisocial behaviour are often separately
analysed, and the current study provides a prime example as to why. In the case of antisocial
behaviour, an interaction between moral identity internalization and moral self-theory was
produced. This interaction specifically suggests that holding an incremental moral theory may in
fact insulate an individual from the effects of holding moral identity as less important to their
sense of self. From another perspective; seeing moral character as more rigid and unchanging,
while also having morality as less important to your sense of identity, would seem to elevate the
likelihood of antisocial behaviour. A more extreme example of this trend can be seen in research
on criminality in youths, in which it was suggested that holding an incremental view promoted
attempts at self-regulation and questioning of behaviours, whereas those holding an entity view
were less likely to question their reactions to adverse situations and see themselves as less likely
to regulate their behaviour (Gerber & O’Connell, 2012). Along similar lines, Schumann and
Dweck (2014) suggested that individuals who hold incremental views on personality were more
likely to accept responsibility for their negative actions. They propose that incremental theorists
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are more able to accept responsibility as they feel less threatened by it, and are more likely to
view the situation as a chance to improve.
A counterpoint to this finding was demonstrated in one study that found priming an
incremental theory of morality led to an increased intention to discriminate (Huang et al., 2017).
It was theorized that holding incremental beliefs about morality would potentially reduce internal
constraint, and lead to increased immoral behaviour. The authors used an expanded version of
the Implicit Theories of Morality Scale (Levy et al., 1998) adapted specifically for moral
character, which contained separate items for incremental and entity views. The study’s
dependent variable was intent to discriminate during a hypothetical job interview, and their
results showed that a tendency towards incremental theory was predictive of increased intent to
discriminate against Hepatitis B positive interviewees. Huang and colleagues (2017) third study
confirmed the findings of their previous study, which opens the door to questioning whether an
incremental theory of morality will actually promote moral behaviour. However, is not without
limitations: the most serious of which is the lack of control groups. With no comparison group it
is impossible tell what the comparable characteristics of the population are. When further
examining the in-person results, we see a very large difference between the groups (d = .731).
This is a very large effect size indeed for predicting moral behaviour (cf. Hertz & Krettenauer,
2016; Malti & Krettenauer, 2013; Villegas de Posada & Vargas-Trujillo, 2015, Wang et al.,
2017). Construed another way this would mean the incremental group was approximately 3.5
times more likely to act immorally. Add to this the uncertain demographics associated with
unrestricted online recruitment and participation for some of the studies, and these findings
themselves may be more questionable than evidential. If we cannot be sure that our participants
are not simply filling out surveys for the monetary reward, or even have the ability to adequately
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describe our sample; that takes away our ability to generalize our findings, regardless of
significance. What can be taken away from their findings is the doubt in regards to the effect of
incremental views of morality on moral behaviour. Clearly a more rigorous and thorough
methodology employing an actual behavioural measure is warranted.
In regards to prosocial behaviour, the current study provides a simpler story than that of
antisocial behaviour. The bivariate correlation between holding an incremental Moral SelfTheory and prosocial behaviour that is present in the study persists when other variables such as
the symbolization component of moral identity are accounted for in a regression. Research into
prosocial environmental behaviour has found a relationship between behavioural intentions and a
view of the world as malleable (Soliman & Wilson, 2017), which may explain the positive
relationship between having an incremental moral theory and general prosocial behaviour seen in
the current study.
While evidence was found for age-related increases in moral identity internalization and
antisocial behaviour, there is no indication of any such linear trend for Moral Self-Theory. The
youngest age group was found to have a less incremental view of morality as compared to the
older groups, but the middle and late adolescents did not show a difference. It was actually the
early adolescent groups that showed the highest raw scores (most incremental) of the age groups.
This pattern is the opposite of what has been shown in intelligence beliefs, where elementary
school students scored as more incrementalist compared to high school students (Leonardi &
Gialamas, 2002). This aspect of Moral Self-Theory would seem to more closely resemble the
increase in cross-context differentiation for moral identity seen by Krettenauer and colleagues
(2016). In that study adolescents saw their moral identity as increasingly differentiated across
different social contexts, but in a non-linear trend. This non-linear pattern saw the cross-context
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differentiation decrease in adulthood and beyond, which may also explain the higher number of
older adults from Chapter 2 that did not expect their morality to change in the future.
As with all research, the current study is not without limitations. One of the largest
limitations comes with the use of the age groups. While the gaps in grades, and therefore ages,
were intentional; they had the unintentional side effect of producing a conundrum as to how best
to approach the variable of age with regards to cohort effects. For the most part, age was treated
as a continuous variable rather than a grouping variable. Development clearly plays a role in the
changes to morality and moral behaviour, so how best to capture this can be challenging,
especially given individual differences within age.
Further to this, the elementary school and high school samples were taken from a
Catholic school board in the region. As it is not mandatory that students adhere to the Catholic
tradition, it is far more representative of the population as a whole than in the past. However, as
there is still a religious component to the education in the form of specific, mandatory, religion
courses that must be taken, there may be confounds in comparing the developmental trend of
Catholic students to a far more diverse sample, as represented by the university students in the
oldest age group. This difference in samples may have contributed to the non-linear trend seen in
some variables, but that would be best left to replication studies.
For the moral identity scores there was lower reliability than what was expected,
especially in the early adolescent subsample. Although the reliability was not unacceptably low,
it could have impacted correlations and comparisons within that age group, decreasing the
likelihood of significant results. However, as moral identity has shown mean level increases
from adolescence to emerging adulthood (Krettenauer et al., 2016); it could be a case of the
youngest groups not yet having reliably formed a moral identity.
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While experimental manipulation of moral identity or Moral Self-Theory are certainly
possible, it seems unlikely that they will be able to be primed independently in the same
procedure, as the moral aspect of the research will always be evident and this would prevent a
true control group for moral identity priming. This may mean that some form of post-hoc
categorization may be necessary, and thus an increase in sample size would be warranted, or that
the analysis may rely on linear regressions for analyses. In either case, the correlational nature of
this study prompts an investigation into whether the relationships demonstrated here will be able
to produce changes in moral behaviour patterns in an experimental design, or if they are more
suited to describing general behavioural trends.
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Chapter 4

Testing the Effect of Moral Self-Theory Manipulation on Behaviour
The aim of the third and final study of this research program is to build on the previous
correlational study, and further examine the effects of holding a view of personal morality as
flexible on moral behaviour. In other words, if the individual sees their morality as able to
change and/or grow, how will that affect their behaviour? The current expectation is that
understanding Implicit Self-Theory as applied to the moral-self, termed here Moral Self-Theory
(MST), can help us in understanding and predicting moral behaviour. Moral self-theory can be
seen as a bipolar construct, in which an individual scoring at one end of the scale would see their
own personal morality as fixed and unchanging over time (entity view), whereas an individual at
the opposite end of the scale would see their morality as malleable and able to change over time
(incremental view).
In Chapter 3, relationships were explored between moral identity, moral motivation,
Moral Self-Theory, and moral behaviour. A bivariate correlational relationship was found
between Moral Self-Theory and prosocial behaviour, and even after including other factors such
as moral identity and moral motivation, this relationship remained. Participants who rated their
Moral Self-Theory as more malleable showed more prosocial behaviour. While there was no
direct relationship between Moral Self-Theory and antisocial behaviour, further analyses
revealed an interaction between Moral Self-Theory and the internalization of moral identity. This
interaction had participants with a lower indication of moral identity internalization, along with a
less malleable Moral Self-Theory, having higher scores when reporting past antisocial behaviour.
In other words, when a more incremental view of morality was held, there was no difference
between having high or low moral identity internalization, but when an entity view of morality
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was held, having low moral identity internalization was associated with an increase in selfreported antisocial behaviour.
Considering these findings, a logical next step would be to empirically test whether
manipulating individuals' views on the malleability of morality can lead to differences in actual
moral behaviour. Therefore, the goal of Chapter 4 is to test experimentally whether providing
support for a view of Moral Self-Theory as malleable (incremental view), or alternately fixed
(entity view) would be predictive participants’ moral behaviour. As Chapter 3 showed
differences in the relationships between the variables depending on whether the moral behaviour
was antisocial or prosocial, both types of behaviours were examined.
The cumulative effect of the previously-examined relationships between moral identity,
moral motivation, and Moral Self-Theory may be expressed as individuals either continuously
striving to be moral (incremental theorists, internal motivation, integration goal), versus those
who simply want to be seen as moral (entity theorists, external motivation, display goal), but the
effects of this theoretical distinction could bear clarification. While this may seem confounded
with the internalization versus symbolization of moral identity, this distinction that is provided
by the belief that one can change their morality should not be discounted. The allowance for
change and growth in morality that someone with an incremental moral self-theory holds could
maintain the internal motivation for moral behaviour. This could serve as long term motivation
maintenance of a sort, sustaining moral behaviour over longer periods of time. These findings
provide us with some idea of the differences the implicit theories may provide in terms of
motivation, but it has yet to be demonstrated how this will appear in terms of immediate
opportunities for moral behaviour. Some direction can be inferred from the findings of Yeager
and colleagues (2013b) in which incremental (belief in self-change) self-theories were used in an
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intervention workshop for a diverse young adolescent population. The intervention group
showed less aggressive behaviour post-intervention as compared to a control group, as well as
compared to a group that were given a coping skills workshop. The work by Yeager and
colleagues with personality self-theory mirrors that of Dweck’s body of work with incremental
self-theory and intelligence, which may also provide valuable insight into the workings of Moral
Self-Theory.
When reviewing the literature on Dweck’s Implicit Self-Theory, parallels to the findings
from Chapter 3 of the present research program become salient. It is clear that believing one’s
personality can change (an incremental view) would be beneficial (e. g., Yeager et al., 2013a;
2013b; 2014). When the results from Chapter 3 are carefully examined, it would seem that
holding an entity view of one’s moral self-concept amplifies the effects of having a lower moral
identity, allowing for more antisocial behaviours. In effect, an individual holding a view that
morality is not especially important to who they are, and that they are unlikely to change in that
regard, would seem to give them an excuse to not behave in accordance with socially accepted
moral norms. It could also be an indication that they will not seek self-improvement in the moral
realm. Similarly, when a study by Haimowitz and colleagues (2011) on the effects of
incremental theory of intelligence on academic motivation is taken into account, a parallel effect
can be seen: incremental theory insulated students from a decline in intrinsic motivation. Thus,
an individual having a view that their intelligence is stable and unchanging led to a decline in
intrinsic motivation as well as a decline in grade point average.
These findings can also speak to another important aspect of morality research: moral
motivation. If moral motivation plays a role in the strength of the relationship between moral
identity and moral behaviour, then Moral Self-Theory may be able to help reveal the nuances of
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this role. When reviewing the body of work on incremental self-theory and intelligence, another
effect that has been demonstrated and may prove applicable is incremental theory’s relationship
with goal pursuit and achievement (Costa & Faria, 2018; Kennett & Keefer, 2006; Robins &
Pals, 2002). In academia, this can lead to holding positive, effort-based strategies (Smiley et al.,
2016), rather than negative strategies such as cheating (Blackwell et al., 2007). Again, this may
parallel morality in that holding the belief that moral identity is malleable may allow for
individuals to be more accepting towards necessary changes and accommodations that might
prevent antisocial behaviour, or lead to prosocial behaviour. This specific example can be seen
with pro-environmental intentions in a study by Soliman and Wilson (2017). In this study,
holding a generally incremental view of the world allowed for greater likelihood of belief that
climate change is anthropogenic, as well as the belief that personal actions can be effective in
effecting change. Furthermore, another parallel between incremental theory in intelligence and
Moral Self-Theory may possibly be seen in their ability to be manipulated.
Manipulation of Moral Self-Theory
As the aim of study 3 is to experimentally test the effects of Moral Self-Theory and their
applicability to moral behaviour, it would make sense to first examine whether Moral SelfTheory can be effectively manipulated. Previously, lay theories have been manipulated through
priming either an incremental or entity view for more general contexts such as personality (Chiu,
Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Molden, Plaks, & Dweck, 2006; Yeager et al. 2011), or specific
characteristics such as intelligence (Hong et al., 1999; Leith et al. 2014). Additionally, Leith and
colleagues (2014) showed that individuals actively regulate and shift their incremental views,
depending on their motivation. This may highlight an important interconnection between moral
self-theory and other moral constructs that would allow for long term maintenance of the desire

SELF-CHANGE AND MORALITY

61

to act morally. If we draw a distinction highlighted by Cropanzano and colleagues (2001), we
can assume that the study in Chapter 3 provided more of a social-entity approach. Moving
forward in this chapter necessitates taking what they would term an event approach.
A literature review conducted by Huang et al. (2017) yielded only one instance of moral
self-theory being manipulated, however the manipulation was successful across multiple studies.
Examples of incremental self-theories being successfully manipulated in other domains beyond
intelligence do exist, and the vast majority of these are manipulations of views on an individual’s
general personality (e.g. Wurthmann, 2017; Yeager et al., 2011; 2013; 2014). Some of these
studies show that the manipulation of the self-theory for general personality may have impacts
on attributes and behaviours with moral implications, such as hostile intent (Yeager et al., 2014),
awareness of duty-based versus rights-based moral violations (Wurthmann, 2017), admissions of
responsibility for transgressions (Schumann & Dweck, 2014), response to victimization (Yeager
et al.,, 2013), and even endorsement of negative traits for an out-group (Levontin et al,, 2013).
There is however, a dissenting line of research that Strohminger and Nichols (2014)
produced, which suggests our moral traits are a more essential part of our self-concept; even
more so than personality, memories, desires and preferences, or perceptions. Despite this,
although it may be more likely that those who endorse more entity views of morality would be
resistant to any provided manipulation, this has not been investigated. What has been explored is
that, despite evidence for a folk notion of a true self as a moral self, researchers were able to
manipulate the perception of the true-self, in terms of moral versus immoral, as an independent
variable (Newman et al., 2015, study 5). This particular study, drawing on a philosophical
concept known as “weakness of will” (see Sousa & Mauro, 2015 for details) had participants
read passages describing an agent as either fundamentally good, or fundamentally evil, and rated
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their happiness after performing either immoral or moral impulsive acts contrary to previously
stated intentions. Participants actually rated the fundamentally evil agent as happier than the
fundamentally good agent after performing immoral actions, suggesting that participants held the
expectation that the target’s true self was actually evil, rather than moral (Newman et al., 2015).
Considering this, it would be reasonable to assume that even someone with an entity view of
their own moral self would be affected by an experimental manipulation. Prompted by
incremental and entity theories being induced for general personality, when the previously
mentioned evidence for the manipulation of moral self-theory and self-theories in general is
considered, it would seem there is solid theoretical ground beneath the prediction that moral selftheory could be manipulated experimentally.
In a meta-analysis by Hertz and Krettenauer (2016), moral identity was found to have a
significant overall effect on moral behaviour. However, while this effect size did not decrease
when the methodology was changed from self-report surveys to studies with other-reported
behaviours, it did drop when experimental studies used direct and immediate behavioural
observations, or implicit measures, as dependent variables. This could be evidence that
additional issues lie in experimentally testing the effects of moral constructs on immediate
behaviour, as opposed to measuring their effects on self-reported behavioural trends. An
additional concern with experimentally testing the effects of Moral Self-Theory on immediate
behaviour comes when considering its interaction with moral identity internalization in
predicting antisocial behaviour, as seen in study 2 of this program. Taking these concerns into
account, it would be prudent to include other moral constructs, especially moral identity
internalization, in the current study’s design.
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How would having a high or low moral identity be affected by holding an incremental
Moral Self-Theory? The findings of study 2 would suggest that having a strong incremental
Moral Self-Theory might insulate those with a lower moral identity score from acting immorally,
but this was in self-reported behaviour, as opposed to prompted and observed behaviour. As
previously discussed, moral identity may have a larger effect size in strictly self-report studies
over those with experimental priming of morality or observational measures of behaviour (Hertz
& Krettenauer, 2016). In addition to this potential decrease in effect size, in Huang and
colleagues’ (2017) study, only antisocial behaviour (cheating and discrimination) was used when
they found significant effect of Moral Self-Theory on moral behaviour. These pieces of evidence
cast some doubt as to the role of incremental moral theory in prosocial behaviour.
In Chapter 3 of this program, participants’ Moral Self-Theory (MST) was explored in
relationship to their moral identity, moral motivations, and moral behaviours. In that study, MST
played a direct role in predicting prosocial behaviour, as well as having a moderating
relationship with moral identity in predicting antisocial behaviour. Given this potential
moderating role it is essential to include a measure of moral identity in any experiment aimed at
capturing the relationship between MST and antisocial behaviour.
Hypotheses
The current study experimentally tests the relationships explored in Chapter 3, using
methods that have been previously employed to manipulate self-view of change, and two
different dependent variables (prosocial and antisocial behaviour). Moral identity will be
measured using the modified version of the Self-importance of Moral Identity (Aquino & Reed,
2002) scale from Chapter 3. The results from Chapter 3 give a clear expectation for the effects of
Moral Self-Theory on prosocial behaviour. In Chapter 3 having an incremental MST was
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associated with an increase in the likelihood of prosocial behaviour. Therefore, it is hypothesized
that the group receiving the incremental MST manipulation will be more likely to act
prosocially, as compared to the entity MST group. While Huang and colleagues’ (2017) findings,
where higher ratings of incremental beliefs were associated with increased discrimination, sheds
some doubt as to the effects of a high incremental MST on the likelihood of acting antisocially,
the current hypothesis will draw on the present research program’s Chapter 3 results. The
findings from Chapter 3 of this program provide a better foundation for the hypotheses as they
use a similar sample, and more similar measures. Chapter 3 provided evidence that holding a
malleable Moral Self-Theory interacted with a low moral identity internalization to reduce the
likelihood of antisocial behaviour. Therefore, the expectation for the antisocial behaviour portion
of the current study is that the incremental MST manipulation will decrease the occurrence of
antisocial behaviour, especially for those with lower moral identity internalization.
Method
Participants
As the aim of Chapter 4 was to further examine the results of Chapter 3, the effect sizes
obtained in Chapter 3 were utilized for an a priori sample size calculation to ensure that the
power of the experiment was sufficient. Thus, an effect size of β = .129 was used along with
either four or six predictor variables at α = .05, to determine the sample size
(https://www.danielsoper.com/statcalc/default.aspx). The analysis indicated that an approximate
cell size of 100-110 would be preferred. As can be seen in Table 10, after participant exclusions,
one cell had 90 participants while all others had at least 100.
The sample for Chapter 4 consisted of 615 participants, with 399 (64.9%) identifying as
female, 212 (34.4%) identifying as male, and 4 (0.7%) identifying as non-binary or preferring to
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not specify. The sample was collected from students at a mid-sized Ontario University, and thus
95.1% of the sample was aged 18-22 years (M = 19.73, SD = 2.76). The sample was primarily
(82.4%) Canadian born, with the average length of time spent in Canada at M = 10.49 (SD =
6.30) years among those not born in Canada. Participants were recruited through online
recruiting and study participation sites through the university, and primarily came from
psychology or business related programs. Participants were compensated with course credit for
participating in the study.
As a random number generator was used for group assignment, and participant
completion time was screened after assignment, the number of participants in each condition was
not equal. Participants’ data were removed from the set if they took an inappropriate amount of
time to complete the study, or if they did not respond to the questions about the manipulation
excerpt, as this was interpreted as the participant not having read the excerpt. Table 10 shows the
distribution of participants across all between-subject conditions, and Table 11 displays some of
the key variables from the proposed analyses, along with some possible covariates that were
included in the questionnaire. It is important to note that a higher value for the Moral SelfTheory scale indicates more of an entity view of morality.
Materials
All participants completed an online questionnaire which was administered via the
Qualtrics survey system. The questionnaire contained a demographic section, one of the three
excerpt blocks (incremental, entity, control) which included several questions about the main
theme of the excerpt in addition to the excerpt itself, a behavioural measure (prosocial or
antisocial), a manipulation check, the Self-Importance of Moral Identity scale (Aquino & Reed,
2002), and then a debriefing page. The statement order for the SIMI was randomized. The
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manipulation check was the three item version of Dweck and colleagues’ (1995) measure for the
implicit self-theory of morality.
The three excerpts were designed to look like they were taken from psychological
publications such as Psychology Today. They were all matched for length, with the incremental
and entity excerpts also being matched for wording, as well as number and type of arguments.
Full text of all three excerpts is presented in Appendix II. The control excerpt was actually taken
from a previous publication on moral emotions in children (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2014) so as to
equally prime morality, but not incremental or entity mindsets. The thematic questions after the
excerpt were designed to force the participants to read the excerpt in detail and think about the
arguments therein, while also relating it back to their own experiences. None of these questions
were forced response, but they were used in screening participants for attention. Any participants
who did not at least rate the persuasiveness of the excerpt were excluded from the study. Of the
840 participants who initially signed up to complete the survey, 128 (15.2%) were excluded for
failing to answer this question.
Procedure
Upon consenting to participate in the study, each individual was first randomly assigned
to either the prosocial or the antisocial stream. The full survey flow is presented in figure 3. After
assignment to a survey stream, all participants encountered one of three randomly assigned
excerpt blocks, with a segment of text ostensibly taken from a published article. In the two
experimental conditions, the article extolled the research demonstrating that our moral traits are
stable (entity condition), or constantly in flux (incremental condition). The third group was
assigned to a control condition which described the results of research into the moral emotions of
young children. Upon reading the text, participants were asked questions about the main theme
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of the text, and to rate its persuasiveness. This was partially because the cover story for the study
was that they were being tested on reading comprehension, but had the added benefit of being
able to further analyze the effectiveness of the excerpts. Although none of the questions asked
were forced choice, the question as to the persuasiveness of the excerpt was used as a screening
tool. If a participant did not answer this question they were excluded from the sample, as this
was taken as a sign that they had not fully engaged with the task. The participants were then
given the behavioural measure.
For the prosocial subsample participants were given a brief description of the local
Habitat for Humanity charity, and asked if they would be willing to donate time or money to the
cause. If they indicated a willingness to donate time or money, they were then asked to enter an
email address they could be contacted at to proceed with the donation. Following this, they were
asked several questions about how positively they viewed charities, including the specific charity
mentioned previously, along with their previous donation behaviour. These questions were
included as control variables to assist in determining the suitability of the behavioural measure.
Alternatively, the antisocial stream was given a word jumble task, similar to that which
was used previously by Wiltermuth (2011), but adapted for online use. Participants had two
minutes to unscramble as many word jumbles as possible, and were told that for every jumble
solved, they would receive an entry into a draw for a $50 Starbucks gift card. Participants had to
click on a button to reveal the first jumble (and start the timer), as well as click on a button
(labelled Done. Reveal scramble #2) to indicate their completion of the displayed jumble and
bring up the next. Unbeknownst to the participants, jumbles three and nine were both nearly
impossible to solve. The timer was set to automatically advance to the follow-up questions at the
end of the two minutes. The follow-up questions admitted that the software could not actually
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know if they had solved the jumbles, and asked them to be as honest as possible while answering
questions about how many jumbles they had actually solved and if they had revealed any
anagrams before solving the previous one.
After the behavioural measures, participants were given a manipulation check using the
three-item Moral Self-Theory (self version) measure from Chapter 3, and Aquino and Reid’s
(2002) SIMI. They were then given a thorough debriefing as to the deception used and actual
purpose of the study, and given another chance to withdraw their data from the study. A total of
15 participants asked to have their data removed.
Analysis Plan
The prosocial dependent variable was scored as categorical for whether time, money, or
neither was donated. A multinomial logistic regression will be used to determine the odds ratio
of donation for either time or money. It is expected that those who were given the manipulation
for the malleability of their moral self-theory will be more likely to donate time or money in the
prosocial outcome. For the antisocial measure the main analysis will be a linear regression with
the experimental groups dummy coded. Both subscales of the SIMI will be included in the first
level of the regression, and the interactions with the experimental groups will make up the
second level. The participants’ scores on the quiz will be used as the dependent variable. For the
antisocial outcome, it is expected that the interaction term between the Self-Importance of Moral
Identity measure and participants who received the stability of moral self-theory manipulation
will have a higher score on the quiz.
Results
One-way ANOVAs with Scheffe post hoc comparisons were used to determine if there
were differences between the experimental conditions for all of the variables in Table 11,
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including the manipulation check. A significant effect was found for Moral Self-Theory, F
(2,612) = 19.60, p < .001, η2 = .06; with all three manipulation groups significantly differing
from each other. The only other significant main effect from these variables was for “How
persuasive was this excerpt?” This question that was asked only of the prosocial group showed a
significant main effect F (2,612) = 5.82, p = .003, η2 = .019 with the control condition being
significantly different from both of the manipulation conditions, while the manipulation
conditions did not differ from one another.
Prosocial Behaviour
The dependent variable for prosocial behaviour was a question regarding donation to
specified charity, Habitat for Humanity, including the necessity of leaving a valid email address
as a condition of donating time or money. As can be seen in Table 11, the charity was generally
seen as a very positive one (M = 5.98, SD = .91). The first analysis was that which had been
proposed: a binary logistic regression with the two manipulation conditions as dummy variables,
and the moral identity subscales as continuous variables. A second step to the analysis was added
to account for the possible interaction between the variables. The first step of the model did not
achieve significance, χ2 = 4.003, p = .406, Nagelkerke r2 = .019. The second step of the model
also proved non-significant χ2 = 6.660, p = .155, Nagelkerke r2 = .049. One interaction did
approach significance however: The interaction between the incremental Moral Self-Theory
condition and those with a high score on the symbolization subscale of the SIMI; b = -.639, Wald
= 3.739, p = .053. See Table 12 for full results.
Antisocial Behaviour
The antisocial behavioural measure was analyzed via linear regression, with the
dependent variable of how many anagrams participants indicated they had solved by clicking on
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the button that indicated completion of the jumble, and produced the next one. This continuous
variable was selected in an attempt to tailor the procedure for online distribution, and as there
was no actual verification of a correct response being employed for any of the scrambles. As
study 2 suggested that moral identity should have an interaction with Moral Self-Theory for
antisocial behaviour, the two moral identity subscales from Aquino and Reed (SIMI; 2002) were
included as predictor variables, as well as used in interaction terms for a second model. This
initial analysis was not significant, F (4,297) = 1.747, p = .140, r2 = .010,2 although the SIMI –
Symbolization subscale did provide a significant result t = 2.600, p = .010, η2 = .149. The
addition of the interactions as a second step in the model did not improve the model F (8,293) =
.994, p = .441, r2 < .001, additionally rendering the symbolization variable non-significant as
well. Full results are shown in Table 13. A simple tabulation of the responses showed that 110
out of the 314 participants (35.0%) indicated that they had solved all nine scrambles, and thus
likely lied at least twice about correctly solving the word scramble.
Discussion
The current study sought to build on the results from study 2 of this research program,
and empirically test whether the effects found in that study would be present when prompting
moral behaviour under experimental conditions. It was expected that priming an incremental
self-concept would increase prosocial behaviour, and priming a stable moral self-concept would
interact with low moral internalization to increase antisocial behaviour.
Evidence is seen from the initial analyses of the variables that moral self-theory was
successfully primed, as all three conditions differed from each other in the expected manner,
with the control condition indicating a more stable view of moral self-concept than the
2

All r2 values reported in this section represent adjusted r2 values
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Incremental group, but not as stable as the Entity group. As all three excerpts dealt with morality
in some manner, it was assumed that morality would be primed in all three excerpts, but that the
difference between the groups would be due to the incremental or entity moral self-concept
primes alone. Moral identity itself was not primed directly, as it was seen as unnecessarily
confusing to add another prime. Additionally it would have been difficult to prime moral self
theory in a control condition for the moral identity prime. In fact, there were no significant
differences in the experimental groups on either of the Moral Identity subscales, nor on the
variables concerning participants’ views on charities within the prosocial outcome.
There were no significant effects of the experimental conditions on prosocial behaviour
direct or otherwise. While there was an interaction between the incremental condition and
symbolization trending towards significance, the fact that the overall model was not significant
needs to be heeded. Additionally, the trend was such that holding a more incremental view of
their moral self-concept for those with high scores on the symbolization subscale actually
decreased the prosocial behaviour intention. This is of course unexpected, as previous research
has only indicated a positive relationship between moral identity symbolization and prosocial
behaviour (Gotowiec & van Mastrigt, 2019; Winterich et al., 2013). If it were assumed that the
relationship between the variables in the current study are actually as suggested here, that may
indicate holding a malleable view of moral self-concept could inhibit individuals from acting
prosocially. If it is presumed that the lack of immediate prosocial action does not meaningfully
impact their overall moral character, as it is malleable, and there is no audience to demonstrate
their moral character to, the individuals might avoid prosocial actions they might otherwise take
if observed. This interpretation makes the results of the current study supportive of a moral
hypocrisy view, in which actors are motivated to maintain the appearance of morality to garner
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the social rewards, while privately acting in a self-serving way (Batson, 2011). If there is nothing
to be gained, and no social cost to a lack of action due to anonymity, they may not have any
motivation to act prosocially.
Turning to the antisocial behaviour measure used in the current study, again puzzling
results were found. Not only did the overall model fail to reach significance, but even those
individual variables that did achieve significance represent unexpected outcomes. In the base
model only moral identity symbolization achieved significance, which again must be taken in
light of the non-significant overall model, and it provided a result that indicated that holding a
higher level of symbolization was actually associated with an increase of antisocial behaviour.
While this may be aligned with the results seen in the prosocial behaviour portion of this study, it
is by no means an expected result. Even with the use of a different, but related, dependent
variable the same pattern of results persists. Unfortunately the results of the measure do not shed
any light on the reasons for the lack of significance, as it may be entirely possible that
participants simply misunderstood, or did not carefully read, the instructions and clicked to
advance to the next scramble when they became bored with it, rather than when they had actually
solved the scramble.
The most noteworthy result of this study may be producing evidence that moral selfconcept can be manipulated, towards both an entity view and an incremental view. Also, if it is
assumed that all of the results are true, one interpretation of the results would be that the stability
of an individuals’ moral self-concept likely does not impact their immediate behaviour. This is
not the same as saying it does not impact behaviour, as in behaviour trends or behaviours over a
longer time span, simply that it likely gets “lost in the shuffle” of the multitude of other
motivators and influences of immediate moral behaviours.
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While the results are disappointingly spare of significant results, the current study did
produce significant results and interesting findings. Obviously, it is not without fault, with the
most notable the medium of the study itself. The entirety of participants for this study
participated online using an anonymous online survey platform. Importantly, the data was
collected during an extended period of isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic. While the
study was designed as an online-only study, the effect of the increased isolation and amount of
time spent online cannot be understood at this time. This level of anonymity may have some
impact on not only the perception of behaviours as moral or not, but on individuals’ willingness
to engage in them. Whether this is due to the knowledge that their identity is safely anonymous,
or that there can be no real repercussions, the online medium has the potential to be affected by
different factors than situations encountered in the face-to-face or even remote but synchronous
real-world contexts (Jackson et al., 2009). While there have been studies that have examined the
differences in moral behaviour for online versus real-world contexts, they are rare and have not
yet found any differences in behavioural rates (Waeber, 2021). This aspect of the online
environment is most certainly an area that needs exploration in future studies. In addition, the
behaviours chosen to represent prosocial and antisocial behaviours may have not been the
optimal choices. Whether through unclear wording, or uninteresting tasks, the behavioural
choices presented may have not been seen by the participants as moral. If that was the case, then
no amount of moral self-concept manipulation would have proved effective in shaping their
behaviour.
General Discussion
Overall, the three studies in this research program aimed to explore and elucidate the role
of change in a person’s moral self view, and the effect thereof on their moral behaviour. Chapter
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2 sought to review interview data on the individual’s perspective on changes to their moral
identity from the past to the present, and on into the future. Participants often perceived a change
in their moral identity over time, but there were substantial groups that did not report change, or
very little change, and even those that perceived a negative change. This negative change would
indicate that the participants perceived a decrease in the importance of morality to their selfconcept. Chapter 3 integrated Moral Self-Theory with research on moral identity and moral
motivation, which led to evidence that having an incremental or entity view of one’s moral selfconcept had a relationship with moral behaviour over time. Finally, the manipulation of moral
self-theory in Chapter 4 proved successful as we were able to influence participants towards an
entity view or an incremental view; however it was unable to experimentally produce effects for
the two behavioural outcomes.
The task now is to wring an overall coherence from the results of these three studies.
Examining the three studies of this program together, it is clear that there are individual
differences in whether people view their morality as something that can change or not. This view
can potentially have long lasting effects, throughout an individual’s life, and may indicate that
moral development can continue beyond adolescence. Evidence that Moral Self-Theory differs
across age groups could suggest a developmental trend. We also see moral motivation differing
across age groups, which would warrant a further examination of the relationship between moral
self-theory and moral motivation, especially with regards to their own development, but also
how their relationship with each other may change. It has been demonstrated that internal
motivation decrease over time in an educational context can be ameliorated by holding an
incremental view of intelligence (Blackwell et al., 2007), but longitudinal changes in incremental
views of morality and moral motivation are an area that now clearly demands attention.
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What is also clear is that individuals do not always see changes in their morality as
positive. There was a significant portion of the sample that indicated no desire to change their
morality/moral identity, and believed that it is unlikely to change in the future. This could be due
to already holding morality as central and highly important to their identity, or it could be due to
a more trait-like view of morality and a view that core traits do not change. While holding an
incremental or entity Moral Self-Theory does not appear to have a direct effect on immediate
behaviours, we see evidence that it can influence self-reported behaviour over a longer time
period, as well as relate to other aspects of the moral self-concept. This suggests that holding an
incremental view of their morality may affect the degree to which an individual internalizes a
moral identity, or their moral motivation. An incremental view of morality could even provide
additional internal moral motivation through the developmental goal of increasing competence
rather than focusing on demonstration goals (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).
This motivational account of Moral Self-Theory can be supported by the findings of
Chapter 3. If we consider that an incremental view of morality may provide internal motivation
to act and continue acting morally, then we should see an increase in moral behaviour over a
longer time period. Conversely, holding an entity view of morality would not provide any
additional motivation, and thus individuals would be reliant on other forms of motivation. Indeed
this is supported by what we see in the results of the third chapter. When an entity view is held, a
strongly internalized moral identity seems to be associated with a reduction in the amount of
antisocial behaviour. This would also advance the idea that an entity view of moral self-concept
may foster a sense of denial of responsibility, where the action could be disavowed due to the
unchanging nature of the individual’s morality.
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When we delve further into the general motivational effects of an incremental view of
morality we see parallels with other forms of Dweck’s Implicit Theories. Implicit theories of
personality play a role in shaping hostile attribution biases, which in turn predict aggressive
desires (Yeager et al., 2013a). Implicit theories of moral character have been shown to affect an
individual’s emotional response to a moral transgression (Miller et al., 2007), which when
consolidated with what we know of moral emotions (Malti & Krettenauer, 2013), may indirectly
affect moral behaviour through an association with moral emotions. The view of our morality as
malleable does seem to be associated with the belief that other aspects of the self are also
malleable (Hughes, 2015), and it may be tempting to see Incremental Self-Theory belief as a trait
itself. However there is some evidence that even our belief about our malleability is itself fluid
(Leith et al., 2014). Indeed Chapter 4 in this very program of studies has shown that Moral SelfTheory can be manipulated towards either incremental or entity views, just as interventions have
shown that views on personality in general can be effectively changed (Yeager et al., 2013).
When people have the proper motivation to seeing aspects of their self as an entity or
incremental, their views seem to shift towards the more favourable outcome.
As these shifts are not incompatible with Implicit Self-Theory, the idea that our view of
our morality can be consciously shifted would support a view of moral identity as a situationally
activated social-cognitive schema (e.g. Boegerhausen et al., 2015), rather than a stable trait-like
aspect of our self-concept. While there is certainly a plethora of evidence for moral identity
having trait-like stability across time and a variety of situations (Aquino et al., 2009; Moshman,
2009), there is certainly room for additional investigation into its situational nature. The current
work with Moral Self-Theory can provide justification for further investigation into the
situational nature of our moral identity. Furthermore, if the similarities between Moral Self-

SELF-CHANGE AND MORALITY

77

Theory and the Implicit Self-Theory of intelligence extend beyond manipulation then the
applications could be similar. Interventions to promote incremental thinking and morality as a
goal could serve to maintain internal motivation to act morally over longer periods of time.
Yeager and colleagues (2011; 2013) have shown that an incremental mindset intervention is
possible, and can lead to a reduction in aggressive desires and a desire for revenge. If future
research can produce clearer evidence as to the mechanisms behind Moral Self-Theory’s role in
moral behaviour, an application may be in the promotion of the same motivational benefits
demonstrated by Yeager, but for prosocial behaviours.
While the measurement of Moral Self-Theory’s effect on behaviour may still prove
challenging, it is clear that individuals do have a clear perception of their own morality, as well
as how it may change over time. The current program of studies provides evidence that an
incremental view of the moral self-concept will be advantageous, but that it simply may not have
a discernable effect on immediate behaviours. While this may provide challenges in justifying
interventions to increase the incremental view of individuals, the evidence for them would have
to viewed on a larger scale. Clearly there are situations and conditions in which holding a
malleable view of one’s moral self-concept are advantageous, but are there any disadvantages?
How stable is the manipulation of malleability or stability in regards to moral self-concept? Can
incremental or entity views of moral self-concept be fostered and promoted long term, as with
intelligence? These are all questions that deserve future attention.
Reliably predicting immediate moral behaviour in an experimental setting can be
problematic (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Whitley et al., 1999), but that does not mean we should
not actively examine other constructs that further develop our understanding of morality, moral
identity, and moral behaviour. Neither should we abandon the notion that the degree to which an
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individual holds an incremental view of their moral identity can inform our investigation of
moral behaviour. Moral Self-Theory can be generally predictive of moral behaviour, has
interesting motivational properties, and provides an interesting new way to explore morality and
the moral behaviour. This novel application of Implicit Self-Theory to morality shows promise in
helping us explore whether moral identity is trait-like, a socially activated state, or perhaps even
both. It also provides a valuable tool in the exploration of long term moral motivation. What is
left to future studies is to further delve into the motivational properties of incremental views of
morality, and how they and their relationships with other moral constructs develop.
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Tables

Table 1
Chapter 2 – Means of Self-Reported Moral Identity Ratings by Age Group
Moral Identity

Age Group

Past

Present

Emerging Adult (19-25 years)

2.795 (.523)

3.224 (.237)

Young Adult (26-45 years)

2.960 (.471)

3.361 (.298)

Middle Age (46-65 years)

3.253 (.387)

3.373 (.333)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. EA n = 52, YA n = 66, MA n = 67.
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Table 2
Chapter 2 - Cross tabulation of Participants’ Desire for Change and Expectation of Change

Desire for Change/Stability

Expectation of Change

Stability

Neutral

Change

No Change Expected

34

13

0

Change Possible

13

24

18

Change Expected

8

18

57

SELF-CHANGE AND MORALITY

98

Table 3
Chapter 2 – Mean Age and Self-Reported Change in Moral Identity Ratings

View of Change

Mean Age

Moral Identity

Past

Present

Rejects Change

47.00 (2.29)

3.193 (.446)

3.375 (.311)

Ambivalent to Change

36.01 (1.95)

2.923 (.500)

3.302 (.337)

Embraces Change

37.97 (1.79)

2.998 (.494)

3.320 (.285)

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.
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Table 4
Chapter 3 - Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants

Variable

Early
Adolescents
(10-12 years)

Middle
Adolescents
(14-16 Years)

Emerging
Adults
(18-26 Years)

Full Sample

N

58

89

92

239

Age in years

11.19 (.66)

14.78 (.62)

19.59 (1.65)

15.76 (3.52)

Female %

46.6

58.4

57.6

55.2

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations.
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Table 5
Chapter 3 - Means for Variables Used in Analyses

Early

Middle

Emerging

Adolescence

Adolescence

Adulthood

SIMI- I

4.06 (.62)

4.26 (.62)

4.35 (.62)

4.24 (.62)

SIMI- S

3.44 (.62)

3.52 (.71)

3.30 (.63)

3.42 (.66)

MST

3.00 (.98)

3.52 (.93)

3.25 (.90)

3.29 (.95)

IST-I

3.40 (.97)

3.65 (1.04)

3.56 (1.14)

3.56 (1.06)

SDT – EXT

3.90 (.71)

3.72 (.65)

3.49 (.71)

3.68 (.70)

SDT – INT

4.19 (.66)

3.89 (.67)

3.96 (.67)

3.99 (.68)

Prosocial Behaviour

2.03 (.53)

2.36 (.61)

2.26 (.64)

2.24 (.62)

Antisocial Behaviour

1.10 (.12)

1.22 (.22)

1.35 (.35)

1.24 (.28)

Variable

Total Sample

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. SIMI-I: Self-Importance of Moral
Identity, internalization subscale. SIMI-S: Self-Importance of Moral Identity, symbolization
subscale. MST: Moral Self-Theory. IST-I: Implicit Self-Theory for intelligence. SDT-INT: SelfDetermination Theory, internal motivation. SDT-EXT: Self-Determination Theory, external
motivation.
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Table 6
Chapter 3 - Principal Components Analysis Results- Pattern Matrix

Item

Factor Loading
1

2

My moral character is something very basic about me and it can't
be changed much. (self)

.902

-.087

Whether I am responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained
in my personality. It cannot be changed very much. (self)

.724

.062

There is not much that I can do to change my moral traits (e.g.,
conscientiousness, uprightness, and honesty). (self)

.742

.112

A person’s moral character is something very basic about them
and it can't be changed much. (other)

.787

.082

Whether a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply
ingrained in their personality. It cannot be changed very much.
(other)

.835

-.099

There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral
traits (e.g., conscientiousness, uprightness, and honesty). (other)

.739

.044

You have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can't do
much to change it. (IST)

-.021

.929

Your intelligence is something about you that you can't change
very much. (IST)

-.020

.932

You can learn new things, but you can't really change your basic
intelligence. (IST)

.054

.810

Eigenvalue

5.00

1.26

% variance explained

55.6

14.0

Note. Parenthetical denotations indicate scale origin.
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Table 7
Chapter 3 - Bivariate Correlations Between Study Variables

Variable

1. Age

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

-

2. SIMI-I

.115

.678

3. SIMI-S

-.097

.209*

.729

4. MST

.064

.217*

-.035

.888

5. IST-I

.023

.234*

-.010

.572*

.874

6. SDT-EXT

-.188*

.123

.301*

-.079

-.022

.876

7. SDT-INT

-.112

.261*

.331*

-.026

.038

.614*

.906

8. Prosocial

.123

.130*

.194*

.138*

.095

.116

.186*

.839

9. Antisocial

.327*

-.171*

-.083

-.070

-.122

-.100

-.263*

.222*

Note. Values along the diagonal represent reliability scores of Cohen’s r. SIMI-I: SelfImportance of Moral Identity, internalization subscale. SIMI-S: Self-Importance of Moral
Identity, symbolization subscale. MST: Moral Self-Theory. IST-I: Implicit Self-Theory for
intelligence. SDT-INT: Self-Determination Theory, internal motivation. SDT-EXT: SelfDetermination Theory, external motivation.
* p < 0.05

9

.833
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Table 8
Chapter 3 - Analysis for Moral Behaviour - Prosocial
Variable

β

Constant

t

p

3.655

<.001

MST

.137

2.125

.035

Age

.148

2.303

.022

SDT - External

.021

.264

.792

SDT - Internal

.138

1.670

.096

SIMI – Internalization

.011

.166

.868

SIMI - Symbolization

.159

2.350

.020

Note. SIMI-I: Self-Importance of Moral Identity, internalization subscale. SIMI-S: SelfImportance of Moral Identity, symbolization subscale. MST: Moral Self-Theory. SDT-INT: SelfDetermination Theory, internal motivation. SDT-EXT: Self-Determination Theory, external
motivation.
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Table 9
Chapter 3 - Analysis for Moral Behaviour - Antisocial
Variable

β

t

p

Step 1
Constant

7.242

<.001

MST

-.055

-.913

.362

Age

.346

5.715

<.001

SDT - EXT

.145

1.913

.057

SDT - INT

-.286

-3.690

<.001

SIMI - I

-.149

-2.333

.021

SIMI - S

.030

.479

.633

Step 2
Constant

7.208

<.001

MST

-.075

-1.252

.212

Age

.358

6.000

<.001

SDT - EXT

.143

1.907

.058

SDT - INT

-.287

-3.759

<.001

SIMI - I

-.127

-1.998

.047

SIMI - S

.008

.132

.895

MST x SIMI - I

.177

2.990

.003

MST x SIMI - S

-.072

-1.229

.220

Model Summary
R2

p

.201

<.001

.233

.009
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Note. SIMI-I: Self-Importance of Moral Identity, internalization subscale. SIMI-S: SelfImportance of Moral Identity, symbolization subscale. MST: Moral Self-Theory. SDT-INT: SelfDetermination Theory, internal motivation. SDT-EXT: Self-Determination Theory, external
motivation.
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Table 10
Chapter 4 - Condition by Behaviour Cross-tabulation
Condition

Prosocial

Antisocial

Total

Incremental

108

101

209

Entity

100

100

200

Control

90

116

206

Total

298

317

615
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Table 11
Chapter 4 - Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables

Variable

N

M

Incremental

Entity

Control

MST

615

3.31 (1.30)

2.90 (1.28)

3.70 (1.32)

3.35 (1.28)

SIMI - I

615

4.42 (.62)

4.38 (.67)

4.47 (.60)

4.44 (.60)

SIMI - S

615

3.34 (.64)

3.28 (.66)

3.36 (.66)

3.38 (.59)

615

3.03 (.86)

3.12 (.83)

3.10 (.81)

2.86 (.90)

298a

5.98 (.91)

6.00 (1.01)

5.94 (.81)

6.01 (.89)

290a

6.03 (.93)

5.91 (.94)

6.03 (1.05)

6.16 (.76)

316b

3.82 (1.12)

3.96 (1.02)

3.83 (1.15)

3.68 (1.12)

How persuasive is this
excerpt?
Please rate how positively you
view the specific charity
described previously.
Please rate your feelings on
charities in general.
Does the potential of winning
a gift card add any motivation
for the coming anagram task?

Note. Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. MST: Moral Self-Theory. SIMI:
Self-Importance of Moral Identity, -I internalization and -S symbolization subscales.
a

Only the prosocial condition received these questions

b

Only the antisocial condition received this question
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Table 12
Chapter 4 - Prosocial Behavioural Analysis Donation Behaviour
Variable

B

SE

Wald

p

Step 1
Constant

-.571

.221

6.674

.010

Incremental Condition

-.203

.304

.448

.503

Entity Condition

-.394

.313

1.584

.208

SIMI-I

.219

.148

2.197

.138

SIMI-S

-.075

.130

.331

.565

Step 2
Constant

-.565

.225

6.306

.012

Incremental Condition

-.252

.312

.652

.419

Entity Condition

-.470

.331

2.012

.156

SIMI-I

-.179

.248

.516

.473

SIMI-S

.283

.247

1.308

.253

Incremental x SIMI-I

.582

.352

2.741

.098

Incremental x SIMI-S

-.639

.330

3.739

.053

Entity x SIMI-I

.716

.414

2.995

.084

Entity x SIMI-S

-.387

.332

1.355

.244

Model Summary
R2

p

.019

.406

.049

.222

Note. SIMI: Self-Importance of Moral Identity, -I internalization and -S symbolization subscales.
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Table 13
Chapter 4 - Antisocial Behavioural Analysis Number of Scrambles Solved
Variable

B

SE

t

p

Step 1
Constant

5.582

.281

19.891

.000

Incremental Condition

.170

.409

.416

.678

Entity Condition

.182

.415

.438

.662

SIMI-I

-.214

.178

-1.202

.230

SIMI-S

.478

.184

2.600

.010

Step 2
Constant

5.571

.284

19.642

.000

Incremental Condition

.184

.413

.446

.656

Entity Condition

.175

.418

.418

.676

SIMI - I

-.452

.336

-1.345

.180

SIMI - S

.547

.363

1.509

.132

Incremental x SIMI-I

.234

.442

.529

.597

Incremental x SIMI-S

-.036

.480

-.076

.939

Entity x SIMI-I

.464

.464

1.001

.318

Entity x SIMI-S

-.103

.469

-.220

.826

Model Summary
R2

p

.023

.140

.026

.441

Note. SIMI: Self-Importance of Moral Identity, -I internalization and -S symbolization subscales.
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Figures

Figure 1
Example of Moral Identity Measure with High Cross-Context Differentiation
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Antisocial Behaviour

Figure 2
Chapter 2 - Interaction between Moral Self-Theory and Moral Identity Internalization
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Figure 3
Chapter 4 - Survey Flow Chart
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Appendices

Appendix A - Study 2 Moral Self-Theory Measures
Moral Self-Theory (adapted from Implicit Self-Theory - Dweck, Chiu & Hong, 1995)
6-point scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 6 (strongly disagree).
Intelligence
1. You have a certain amount of intelligence and you really can't do much to change it.
2. Your intelligence is something about you that you can't change very much.
3. You can learn new things, but you can't really change your basic intelligence.
Moral (Self)
1. My moral character is something very basic about me and it can't be changed much.
2. Whether I am responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in my personality. It
cannot be changed very much.
3. There is not much that I can do to change my moral traits (e.g., conscientiousness,
uprightness, and honesty).
Moral (Other)
1. A person’s moral character is something very basic about them and it can't be changed
much.
2. Whether a person is responsible and sincere or not is deeply ingrained in their
personality. It cannot be changed very much.
3. There is not much that can be done to change a person’s moral traits (e.g.,
conscientiousness, uprightness, and honesty).
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Appendix B - Study 3 (Experimental) – Measures
Manipulation Text (Participant sees one of the following excerpts)
1. Entity
Researchers have been studying moral development, and there is considerable evidence that our
moral character is well established by the age of ten. Knowing how a child acts at the age often
can predict pretty accurately how that child will behave at later ages.
For example, one researcher has found that in some psychopathic prison inmates, their brain
fibers were different from others. Another found that knowing how a person behaved in one
situation can predict their behaviour in another situation. Thus, our moral sense is relatively
fixed, an unalterable aspect of our personality, just like intelligence.
We can measure the morality of a person’s actions by how well they reflect our society’s laws
and social norms. Measuring over time and situations can give us a picture of that person’s moral
sense. Because of this established level of morality, the most effective response to immoral
actions does not include the expectation of increasing the person’s moral sense. Rather,
punishment for immoral acts is the most effective response since it focuses on the transgressor’s
likely wish to avoid future pain.
Our sense of morality appears to be part of our biological and genetic makeup, and just like other
biological traits, that sense of morality is the hand we have been dealt with, or as one writer put
it, we have “a foundation of enduring dispositions.” It is therefore the role of our laws and social
norms to provide limits for those whose moral sense is inadequate for the functioning of our
society.
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2. Incremental
Researchers studying moral development have found considerable evidence that our moral
decisions reflect where we are in that development. As we develop socially and emotionally, so
we also develop morally. Morality consists of the choices we make, and those choices are
influenced by our life experiences.
For example, one researcher found that activity in the amygdala of our brain clearly recognizes
wrongdoings/criminal behaviour. It is the acting on that recognition that can change. Another
researcher found that our moral behaviour toward another person is based on empathy, and that
the level of empathy depends on how well the other person is known.
It seems that morality is a fluctuating concept. It is difficult to measure, and the interpretation of
morality can change from culture to culture. The most frequently cited gauge of morality is
respect for human rights. It is made clear in research that both empathy and respect for human
rights can be taught and further developed. Because of this, the most effective response to
immoral actions involves awareness and understanding of the dynamics behind the behaviour.
Our moral behaviour reflects needs, goals, intentions, emotional states, prior behaviours, and
more. Understanding the morality of an action requires understanding those needs, goals or
intentions behind the act. As one researcher noted, "no one's character is hard, like a rock,
unable to change. Everyone can change, only for some more effort and determination is needed
to effect these changes." It is therefore the role of those dealing with immoral behaviour to
address the dynamics behind that behaviour to discover how to effect that change.
3. Control
In a phenomenon specific to young children, when reading or hearing a story in which the
protagonist acts immorally but fulfills a desire, children expect the protagonist to feel happy
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about fulfilling the desire rather than feel sad about acting immorally. Research into this
phenomenon, termed the happy victimizer phenomenon, has found that self-interested emotions
tend to have effects that are opposite to the effects of self-evaluative emotions, in that they
actually decrease the likelihood of moral decisions.
While there is still a great deal of debate as to the exact structure of, and relationships between,
different emotions, including those seen as moral emotions, recent research makes it clear that
moral emotions can be distinguished from one another by crossing two dimensions: valence and
focus. Valence simply refers to the positive or negative association of the emotion, while focus
refers to whether the emotions are brought about through self-evaluation or through the
attainment of a desired outcome in the name of self-interest.

Manipulation Task (All participants)
Please read the article excerpt carefully and answer the following questions:
1. What is the main theme of this excerpt?
2. How persuasive is this excerpt?
i. 5-point scale from 1 (Not persuasive at all) to 5 (Very persuasive).
3. Please tell us what the most persuasive evidence presented in the article was.
4. Please describe a personal experience you’ve had that might support the theme of this article.

Dependent Variables (participant assigned to one)
Prosocial
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Volunteering is an important part of being a member of a community. Habitat for Humanity
Waterloo Region (http://www.habitatwr.ca/) is a non-profit organization working toward a world
where everyone has a decent and affordable place to call home. HabitatWR brings communities
together to help families build strength, stability and independence through affordable
homeownership. With the help of volunteers, donors, and community partners, they provide a
solid foundation for low income families in Waterloo Region. Focused on providing a hand up
and not a hand out, Habitat Waterloo Region partners with families willing to complete a specific
number of volunteer hours, known as "sweat equity," and to repay an interest-free mortgage.
Due to the current situation with COVID-19, Habitat for Humanity has temporarily suspended
their volunteer program. There is concern however, that once they begin again, they will be
facing a shortage of volunteers. If approached by this organization, would you be willing to
make a commitment to donate either: an hour of your time, or $5, to this organization?
1. No, I’m not interested.
2. Yes, I would be willing to volunteer an hour of my time.
3. Yes, I would be willing to donate. (Insert link to HfH donation page here)

Antisocial
Following these instructions you will be given an anagram task. You will have a total of 2
minutes to unscramble 9 words. You will start at the first jumble of letters. Once you solve the
word, then click the button to reveal the next scramble. The software will credit you with solving
the puzzle as soon as you click to reveal the next scramble. For every word you unscramble, you
will receive a ticket for a draw to win a $50 gift card to Starbucks, iTunes, or Tim Hortons.
There are 9 word scrambles, so there is a maximum of 9 entries per participant.
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After the anagram task, there will be some questions to help us analyze the reading task, and then
a short survey about personality type. Please note that you may see these final two sections in a
different order than is given here.
Also, please answer the question below to help us determine the effectiveness of the reward.
Does the potential of winning a gift card add any motivation for the coming anagram task?
None at all
A little
A moderate amount
A lot
A great deal

When you click on the button below, the first scramble will appear. Once you have solved it,
click on the button below it to reveal the next. You will have 2 minutes to complete as many
scrambles as you can.
Good luck.
Reveal scramble 1

unhted
Done. Reveal scramble 2!

eoshu
Done. Reveal scramble 3!
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Done. Reveal scramble 4!

ythoird
Done. Reveal scramble 5!

olarc
Done. Reveal scramble 6!

jnipmug
Done. Reveal scramble 7!

hgitwe
Done. Reveal scramble 8!
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claslou
Done. Reveal scramble 9!

yomseevld
Finished!

As we have no way of knowing whether you actually solved the anagrams, please answer the
following questions as honestly as possible. We cannot link your responses here (or on the quiz)
to any names or accounts, WLU or otherwise.
1. How many word scrambles did you successfully solve?
2. On any of the scrambles, did you reveal the next anagram before solving the previous
one?
3. How tempted were you to move on without solving the anagram?
Thank you for your participation. We regret to inform you that while there is a gift card draw,
every participant will receive one entry into the raffle, so everyone has an equal chance to win.
Please accept our apologies and read the debriefing carefully as it explains the deception used in
this study and why it was necessary.

